The Judiciary - Intelligence Services Conflict When magistrates seem more like KGB spies

Posted in Other | 06-Aug-06 | Author: Piero Laporta

Piero Laporta

The Judiciary and the Intelligence Services love head-on clashes, as happened from the ‘70s until the end of the ‘90s. We are not going to comment on the merits of the Milan events (the kidnapping of Abu Omar). As far as we know, it could all be part of a scene put in place to extract to safety a CIA agent, letting people believe that he had been kidnapped. We note, so far, that the friction between the magistrates and the Intelligence Services - not to be confused with the “secret police”, has managed to maintain a very clear the distinction of their respective roles. The Intel Services, if they come across a crime, pass the action to the judiciary and offer, therefore, a demonstration of their capacity to defend democracy. The secret police, such as the KGB, is, instead, the typical resource of dictatorships (regimes) which count on such organizations (apparatuses) to identify the dissident and neutralize him without intermediate solutions, using gulags, kidnappings, homicides, suicides, arrests without cause (false arrests), detention without charges, mock trials, wiretappings, destruction of the dissident’s social relationships through persecution, defamation, false accusations, press campaigns, preconceived (concocted) investigations, and the like.

Putting gulags, kidnappings and homicides aside, the reader who goes back in our recent history cannot help but find a number of (quite a few)analogies in the folds of the bribes (kickbacks) investigations of the ‘90s, otherwise known as Tangentopoli. During that period, thousands were investigated, whose political and civil life was literally destroyed, only to find out that, at the end of this judicial and unnecessarily long Calvary, the indicted did not merit (was innocent) the cross he had been given to carry. Many regrets, if regrets were expressed at all, and that was the end of it.

This new level of clashes between the Intel Services and the magistrates has an entirely new connotation. A significant part of the judiciary, demonstrating to have full disposal of those methods of control and intercept (eavesdropping/wiretapping), to the point where even the Intel Services are being subjugated, makes a quality leap forward in line with the evolution, or involution, which the investigating judiciary began during the days of Tangentopoli. Today, part of the inquiring judiciary can operate with more incisive (penetrating) methods than the secret police.

This causes a spillover into the powers of the executive, subordinating operationally the Intel Services which previously operated independently but following government directives, and designed to sweep aside emerging dangers between the legal and the illegal, without forcing the government to make undemocratic, politically indefensible decisions. Recently, Ugo Scuro wrote the following in l’Opinione: “Independence does not show itself as a deranged splinter wound (embedded in) into the reality of the State and potentially dangerous. It is the expression of a structured reality, impermeable to external interference, complex in its organization, self sufficient for its assigned missions, hierarchically organized internally, and subordinated directly to the political leadership. Everything flows from politics: from the organization of the three classic powers of government (legislative, executive, and judicial), to the political representatives who carry out their roles without actually being the essence of politics, to the citizens of the state, for whom the principles of political organization reserve day-to-day and supreme (long-term) choices, either through the direct use of the vote and the right to substitute, or indirectly, through elected representatives.”

What needs to be done for the security of the country is the responsibility of the (executive) government, not of the judiciary, but when the latter adds to its already controversial institutional independence methods similar to those of the secret police, there is a danger of crushing this already sick democracy.

To try to describe what awaits us, let us observe that the power balance in the Soviet Union was founded on three legs: the Party (Communist obviously), the KGB, and the Red Army.

The Party could not exist without the repression of dissidents carried out by the KGB. Likewise, the KGB prospered on the consensus orchestrated by the Communist Party. The Red Army, under the control of the Party and the KGB, kept the other two from (abusing power) a spillover.

In Italy, there exists the party which creates consensus, and these are sections of the judiciary-KGB which suffocate (smother) dissent. The Red Army of the various Italian police forces has been under the control of the judiciary for some time now. The analogies with the Soviet model, though not a perfect match, are, however, even more worrisome, while the so-called Intelligence Services, having lost any remaining military connotation, and filled with police elements – politically and operationally control, we repeat, by the investigative judiciary – consume themselves in internal wars to conquer shares of power which has now shifted to the offices of the District Attorneys. If the DAs eavesdrop on the leadership of an Intelligence Service, this means that a significant part of that service responds to the DAs, not to its own leadership. And a judiciary which controls the Intelligence Services would be a secret police much more worrisome than the KGB.