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NATO 3.0 - Fresh Proposals by the World Security Network Foundation

Posted in NATO | 06-Sep-13 | Source: World Security Network Foundation

Twenty respected military and foreign affairs experts from nine different NATO countries presented fresh proposals for an active Alliance in a paper called NATO 3.0, published by the international World Security Network Foundation.

Download the full report "NATO 3.0 - Fresh Proposals by the World Security Network" here

Among them are legendary U.S. Ambassador und Lieutenant General ret Edward L. Rowny, President Reagan's chief negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms (START), World Security Network President Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, Vice Admiral Charles Style, former Commandant of the Royal College of Defense Studies in London, the former Commander of the Queen's Household Division Major General ret Sir Sebastian Roberts, the three retired German Lieutenant Generals Dr Klaus Olshausen, Dr Ulf von Krause and Götz Gliemeroth as well as Estonian Freedom Hero and Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament Tunne Kelam, former Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky, or Turkish Professor Hüseyin Bagci and Professor Umberto Gori from Florence. From Paris Admiral ret. Pierre Lacoste, the former Director of the Directorate-General for External Security, and Rear Admiral ret Jean Dufourcq, the Chief  Editor of Revue Défense Nationale, added the French views on a fresh and successful alliance and Syria.

The independent working group argues:

Once again, NATO's members are called upon to decide if, how and when the Alliance - its leading nation, the United States of America, and willing partners – will engage effectively to contain, if not resolve another brutal conflict in the Islamic world. This time it is Syria, the fifth prospective intervention, following  Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Mali, in only a dozen years. The task has become even more urgent since the recent use of chemical weapons: to prevent their further use; to stop the killing of civilians especially by the Assad regime's Air Force and artillery (although it is already too late for the 100,000 slaughtered); to end the brutal dictatorship in Damascus by all legal means, if necessary military as well as non-military; and to help to build in its place a fair government representing and uniting all of the people of Syria; to stand up for and maintain the human values of the United Nations Charter, not least the rights of minorities; while ensuring the position of Turkey as a member of NATO; all against the background of the tremendous challenge of achieving stability in the whole Middle East region.

The debate over the military and non-military options and associated dilemmas in Washington, London, Paris and other NATO capitals shows once again the need for a better NATO strategy that integrates hard and soft power in peacemaking through a far earlier, more credible and effective crisis response. The tragedies in Syria demonstrate the necessity of a strong defense capability in NATO to complement and underpin diplomacy and other non-military activity, and deter the use of weapons. We need capabilities across the full spectrum of crisis response, from the soft to the hard, integrated into a new dual strategy. We call for innovative tools in the Alliance's military and political approach: a new NATO 3.0.

In his speech at the National Defense University on May 23rd 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that "We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas."  We agree and have to learn from the wisdom of exceptional thinkers like Albert Einstein, who told us that "imagination is more important than knowledge" and that "we cannot solve the problems on the same level of thinking where we have created them." We need to use our Western democratic strengths: creativity and reform capabilities like we do in business. But still, we hesitate to do so in defense and foreign affairs- why?

NATO must become more political, reconsidering the wisdom of Carl von Clausewitz that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means". Defense, including crisis response and foreign policy must be much better interlinked and lead to one action on two pillars of a fresh NATO double strategy.

NATO and its member states now need:

  • NATO can no longer be successful with mere case-by-case short-term crisis management. Its members need to be proactively shaping realities instead of adjusting to them and acting too late when the costs in lives and resources are at their peak.
  • Not more nice demands on paper in communiqués but real action and implementation by all member states. No more blocking of the necessary reforms in the Alliance at the national level, but co-ownership of the NATO Headquarters in an urgent reform process with the 28 Heads of Member States.
  • A list of short- and long-term reform steps, including timetables, price tags and a control mechanism to check up on progress.
  • A totally new set-up, fresh dynamic and ongoing reform process in all member states initiated by a well-coordinated, top-down approach from both the NATO Headquarters and Heads of States and Governments. Otherwise, any reform process will fail.
  • A modern, flexible security and defense structure, including maximum cost-efficiency.
  • Sufficient national funding of two percent of GDP as a NATO benchmark to avoid further erosion of credible defense and to avoid "provocative weakness" (Fritz Kraemer). Most European allies must invest more in modern defense capabilities, which are their insurance against crisis and war and for liberty and stability. Thus, a comprehensive Smart Defense approach by those member states that are willing to proceed in their mutual cooperation should be made mandatory.
  • A much better link between foreign and defense policies to build up an effective early forward defense against new threats using best practices from all over the world and much more creativity.
  • Embedded, tailored double strategies of power and diplomacy – as was so successfully done with NATO's Harmel Report in 1967 or in NATOs Two Track Decision in 1979, using multiple soft tools of peace-making at an earlier stage to contain threats – while being prepared to fight if needed.
  • To analyze and agree on the new threats and how to contain and deter those unknown risks using the hard and soft elements of peacemaking with detailed but flexible action plans rather than only short-term crisis-management when it is very late. The establishment of a NATO Early Warning System in order to identify possible risks, dangers and threats at an early stage and an effective NATO Cyber Defense is clearly justified. This would create new opportunities to put the comprehensive approach into practice, so it would not only always be reacting to live crises with military intervention – rarely at the right time.
  • To focus on the build-up of responsible elites in our partner countries and partners for peace who promote know-how and shared democratic values based on the UN Charter and the Washington Treaty.
  • Both the U.S. and Europe need a solid national economic base in order to afford sufficient armed forces, extend economic support to underdeveloped countries and ensure internal stability and credibility as democracies. For a decade, the XXL-greedies and XXL-public debt have been sawing away at the branch on which we are sitting at NATO. Public debt must be reduced to a stable 60 percent of GDP level in all NATO countries as a basis of transatlantic stability. Without sufficient economic power, the sword of NATO remains dull and the West a lame duck. We only won the Cold War because of the enormous economic superiority of the West, which is now threatened.

A realistic assessment of the present situation of NATO is needed. It is already a coalition of the capable and the willing – as in Libya, Mali or Syria. The U.S. shoulders most of NATO's budgets and is not willing to sustain that burden. Most European governments have until now not shown the political resolve to invest more resources. The Alliance has no authority to dictate anything and is only as strong as the nations want or allow it to be. The UN is not capable of taking the lead in UN politico-military operations. There is no efficient UN structure in the field to parallel the military command structure. The U.S. can use NATO as a tool box, as well as for building greater legitimacy, but NATO has lost some of its significance in the United States.

In times when economics have a major effect on security issues, the Alliance should finally start to widen its focus to those areas of concern much more intensively.

A vibrant, strong, globally-influential and smart NATO 3.0 needs a solid economic base, much more creativity and fresh thinking, the integration of smart ideas and best practices of peace-making at an early stage in clever double-strategies, sufficient funding, a global outlook and risk-assessment and an open debate about options and concrete actions instead of endless talk.

The experts propose several fresh approaches and tools for NATO 3.0:

  • Support for the institutions which fight for our common values – as summarized in the UN-Charter – must be better structured to prevent or contain instability early enough.
  • Any containment partner and nation seeking NATO's help must commit itself to the UN Charter before NATO countries can support it. We cannot strengthen those which do not stand for freedom as defined by the UN but for dictatorship by another name. We must isolate and contain the radicals as well. Going forward, this must be the condition for any political support or NATO intervention in all crises and violent conflicts.
  • No investment in mutual understanding will ever be a waste. If we get this wrong, the consequences for world peace and security could be extreme.NATO states need to focus on cultural awareness and widen their U.S. or European-centric worldview in their defense cooperation, planning and interventions.
  • Our 28 national governments and bureaucracies constitute the main adversarial challenge-we are our own worst enemy. Experience shows that at the end of a frustrating, grinding decision-making process, we usually burn too much money for little output and are too slow, uncoordinated, and inefficient. This dreadful 'red tape monster' is harder to fight than any enemy. It is the Alliance's main Achilles Heel, causing us to win on the battlefield but lose in the long-term and to produce one 'lost victory' after another. Our enemies often do not constitute the main and only threat, which is, rather, our system's inability to enable our nations to deal effectively and creatively with them. This must be radically changed now as part of a fresh NATO 3.0 approach.
  • Proactive policy is missing in standing up for our values- the 'Holy Flame' of the UN Charter- and a better future for our children.
  • The subjunctive has taken over. A growing number of problems are merely being described, but few are being processed and none mastered.
  • We are leaving the initiative to a few radical activists – who represent a tiny minority of around one percent of the global population – and through our passivity we are creating an action vacuum full of provocative weaknesses.
  • We are not acting, but instead becoming the object of action.
  • We are not shaping, but instead reacting to new developments.
  • Thus, we are losing influence and reputation.
  • In view of today's paradigmatic shift in foreign policy, what is needed is a new neutralizing of the numerous time bombs, large and small, that endanger our security, alongside a policy of preventive stabilization within NATO, transcending traditional deterrence.
  • Proactive rather than reactive actions are essential.
  • We must collect, evaluate, strengthen, and implement best practices on a global scale, using all assets including intelligence. Until now, this learning process appears to have been overly bureaucratic, slow and lacking in dynamism.
  • We must analyze and assess well beyond the existing limitations towards political- and military thought, and begin to deliberate in new and broader international networks and coalitions.
  • What is needed is a proactive security policy that identifies and addresses several areas of crisis and conflict before they become a military threat and a new set of preventive and forward-looking defense and stabilization plans with a focus on the containment of radicals, good government, development programs and partnership initiatives with the EU and UN.
  • NATO and its member states should act at the right/appropriate time – before violent conflicts break out – i.e., with a preventive containment policy, and not when the costs of intervention appear to be too high.
  • A NATO Early Warning System for identifying potential crises or conflict areas or issues needs to be established. Once a year, NATO should publish an annual NATO Global Risk Report, which should include proposals for actions to safeguard the Alliance and support the stabilization of the world, with a focus on MENA and failed states.
  • The non-military elements and instruments of peace-making must be better integrated as soft factors into a united foreign, security and defense policy approach. We need a double track of strength/power and diplomacy – as was demonstrated so successfully over decades with the Harmel Report from 1967 and NATO's Two Track Decisions from 1979.
  • For all areas of global conflict, we need new and preventive NATO double strategies tailored to the special conditions, plus special adapted forces. Additionally we need the clear will to deter and defend with all instruments of politics.
  • NATO must – as a condition sine qua non – always establish a detailed and comprehensive strategy and an action plan before it activates its forces. These detailed and plausible plans must include a timeframe with possible exit scenarios, cost-calculations and sufficient funding, best practices from past conflicts, consider the local will of the people involved and negotiations with the adversary from the beginning or reconciliation options - following the advice of Carl von Clausewitz.
  • NATO should set up a NATO Reconstruction Planning Organization, most probably based on a network of existing institutions, like the RCDS or NATO Defense College. This organization could be virtual, helping to deliver modules in existing institutions and courses. Aspects of this new organization could include networking with the right experts; focusing on 'Golden Bridges' for all: reconstruction emphasizing hope, self-respect and self-determination; truth and reconciliation; peace-talks with the enemies from the beginning, looking for a long-term political solution; military and civilian planning; reeducation and the use of the diasporas and massive support for the local and younger 'responsibility-elites'.
  • NATO should also establish a NATO Soft Peacemaking Center for non-military emergencies and crisis response. It can be built around elements of the International Staff of the NATO Headquarters like 'Science for Peace and Security' and 'Civil Emergency Planning'. This new task force should collect best practices on how best to support the containment of instabilities (as we see now in Syria). It must assemble and organize the national and international know-how of all non-military, civil factors in crisis response and peace-making from the NATO missions in Afghanistan and other out-of-area conflicts, like those in Libya and Iraq, so it is reasonably accessible for future missions.
  • To make best use of the know-how of our soldiers, NATO should establish two large NATO Mentoring and People-to-People Programs with 100,000 mentees per year. Experienced former officers recruited as mentors can thus transfer their know-how and moral values to the next generation within NATO and to other forces in countries of special interest (like Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, or Syria). For this task, we require thousands of experienced personalities capable of conveying guidelines for life to the most talented young individuals and devoting much time to them.
  • Once a year, NATO could host a Global NATO Town Hall Meeting in different capitals and invite one thousand representatives of non-governmental organizations to discuss issues of peace and stability with NATO officials and make proposals for the future.
  • In a globalized world, different people's networks and NGOs play an important role. They add unique wisdom, engagement and millions of young activists and concerned global citizens. NATO must better use and integrate these NGOs and social networks into its discussion process and thus add creativity and mutual understanding.
  • NATO should establish formal diplomatic special relationships and liaison offices with new players like the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council and even the People's Republic of China and our Pacific value partners in Japan and Australia.

A fresh NATO 3.0 depends on sufficient and modern defense capabilities, which must be preserved and funded adequately, especially in all European countries. In times of restrained funding, it uses creativity and a steady reform process with a modern smart defense structure to produce the maximum (defense efficiency) with the limited resources (of cash). Without this, the NATO shell will lack a core and the forces of progress would be naked and defenseless, with provocative weaknesses in a demanding world. Only a politically strong and coherent NATO with adequate military and non-military capabilities can credibly deter aggression, contain threats, prevent and respond effectively to crises and thus be a lasting and high lighthouse of freedom and for peace and stability.

NATO 3.0 rests on the basis of the classic policy of power and national interests, but continues its development in a globalized world with new risks, dangers and threats. It provides a link between the indispensable hard factors and the important, manifold, and often overlooked soft factors of crisis response and peace-making aimed at tailored, innovative double strategies for peace and liberty. It uses adaptable long-term planning, including all elements of best practices, timing and funding, to enable NATO countries to use military forces in interventions if required, where it promotes a double approach of power and reconciliation. It is a smart forward defense and flexible response in its use of all soft factors and the best practices of peacemaking by active and engaged foreign affairs and the development policies of the nations involved.

NATO 3.0 activates the new global elites for  responsible improvement of the world in all areas based on the moral foundation of the UN Charter and human rights. Its additional instruments are global networks, knowledge transfer through mentoring programs, creativity, passion, promotion of the human Codes of Tolerance and Respect (see www.codesoftolerance.com), the containment of radicals, improved planning and control, as well as the large commitment of leaders and individuals.

This newly designed NATO 3.0 policy is creative, preventative, action-oriented, extensive, cost-minded, cooperative and profound. It combines political determination with adequate capabilities for engagement as required.

Download the full report "NATO 3.0 - Fresh Proposals by the World Security Network" here

This paper NATO 3.0 is dedicated to the memory of Dr Fritz Kraemer, Mentor, Missionary and Pentagon Strategist, who passed away ten years ago and initiated the World Security Network Foundation together with Dr Hubertus Hoffmann in 2002.

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