

Editorial

'Putin's Russia' was the title of one of Anna Politkovskaya's books, published in 2004. Its post-script, dated 10 July 2004, was written the day after the murder of Paul Klebnikov, the journalist who had been investigating the dubious dealings of some oligarchs, and which was also the day of the murder of Victor Cherepkov who was standing for election as mayor of Vladivostok with a campaign to clean up this most violently corrupt of all of Russia's cities. On 7 October 2006 Anna Politkovskaya was murdered, soon after publication of an article with gruesome account of the atrocities being committed by the regime in Chechnya presided by Ramzan Kadyrov, protégé of the Kremlin. On 13 September saw the murder of Andrei Kozlov, vice-president of the central bank of Russia, who was highly reputed for his efforts to correct irregularities in the banking sector.

This dismal double pair of tragedies confirms that in Putin's Russia people who try to shed light on abusive government or irregular business dealings have to ask themselves, and their families, whether they risk sentencing themselves to death.

Russia wants to be accepted by the EU as an equal partner, and to negotiate a comprehensive new Strategic Partnership Treaty. At the same time it ignores international treaty obligations which it has ratified (Human Rights Conventions), or aspires to (WTO). In its relations with Georgia Russia now provides examples of both.

In retaliation against Georgia's expulsion of some alleged Russian spies the Russian government has adopted many measures to punish Georgia and its people resident in Russia. One of the most shocking has been the Ministry of Interior's instructions to schools in Moscow to report on schoolchildren of Georgian nationality "in order to insure law and order ... as well as to prevent terrorist acts and aggressive sentiments ...". This is in contradiction of the 'Prohibition of Discrimination' (Article 14) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which excludes discrimination on grounds of sex, race, colour, language, religion, national or social origin, or association with a national minority. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child similarly excludes discrimination irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's national, ethnic or social origin. Russia has ratified both Conventions. Meanwhile Russia is Chairman-in-office of the Council of Europe, which one would have expected to be accompanied by impeccable standards of observance of the human rights conventions.

Russia has also shut its frontiers to Georgia and stops all trade. This would be illegal under the WTO, which forbids discriminatory trade restrictions with other WTO members, unless justified on specific economic grounds (such as may

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justify anti-dumping duties). Russia is not yet admitted to WTO, yet complains about the delays in its accession. Russia has similarly been blocking imports of wines from Moldova on alleged technical public health grounds. These restrictions have not been justified technically, while Moldovan wines enjoy increasing sales in the EU market, not known for its lax implementation of public health standards.

... continued on page 2

Russia and Ukraine have agreed a new gas price of \$130 per'000m³, whereupon Prime Minister Fradkov declared "I would say quite openly that we need to synchronise the negotiation process of our countries on WTO". Russia has in the last year been saying that it now applies market prices generally for its energy exports. Now it seems to be agreeing sub-market prices to Ukraine in exchange for trying to curb Ukraine's independent trade policy, quite apart from other issues regarding NATO and Sebastopol.

Russia's leadership observes the need to improve its image at home and abroad, and has elaborated a defensive doctrine about its own model of 'sovereign democracy', coupled to remarks that Russia should not copy Western democracy but have its own Eastern democracy. Yet the substance behind this slogan is absent, but the substance behind the absent rule of law is tragically illustrated by the recent murders.

The leader of a major party group in the European Parliament says now: "The European Union should sign no [new] agreement with Russia until freedom, transparency and the rule of law are established, along with legal certainty for investors that flows from them."

This is an early warning of the hazards of the path ahead should the EU and Russia now try to negotiate the comprehensive new 'Strategic Partnership Treaty' that President Putin desires. Ratification of such a treaty could become impossible, unless Russia's leadership comes to understand what it takes to win respect as an 'equal partner' with the EU, and more simply just to win friends rather than alienate people in the rest of Europe?

Michael Emerson

Anna Politkovskaya - Her own death foretold

October 15 2006. [Link to full article](#)

[Extracts]

It is the way I have had to work throughout the Second War in Chechnya. First I was hiding from the Russian federal troops, but always able to make contact clandestinely with individuals through trusted intermediaries, so that my informants would not be denounced to the top generals. When President Vladimir Putin's plan of Chechenization succeeded (setting "good" Chechens loyal to the Kremlin to kill "bad" Chechens who opposed it), the same subterfuge extended to talking to "good" Chechen officials, many of whom, before they were "good" officials, had sheltered me in their homes in the most trying months of the war. Now we can meet only in secret because I am an incorrigible enemy, not amenable to re-education.

I'm not joking. Some time ago, Vladislav Surkov, Putin's deputy chief of staff, explained that there were people who were enemies but whom you could talk sense into, and there were incorrigible enemies who simply needed to be "cleansed" from the political arena.

So they are trying to cleanse it of me and others like me.

[...]

If a journalist is "not on our side," however, he or she will be deemed a supporter of the European democracies, of European values, and automatically become a pariah. That is the fate of all who oppose our "sovereign democracy," our "traditional Russian democracy." (What on Earth that is supposed to be, nobody knows; but they swear allegiance to it nevertheless: "We are for sovereign democracy!") I am not really a political animal. I have never joined any party and would consider it a mistake for a journalist, in Russia at least, to do so. I have never felt the urge to stand for the Duma, although there were years when I was invited to.

[...]

I will not go into the other joys of the path I have chosen, the poisoning, the arrests, the threats in letters and over the Internet, the telephoned death threats, the weekly summons to the prosecutor general's office to sign statements about practically every article I write (the first question being, "How and where did you obtain this information?"). Of course I don't like the constant derisive articles about me that appear in other newspapers and on Internet sites presenting me as the madwoman of Moscow. I find it disgusting to live this way. I would like a bit more understanding.

No new partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia until the rule of law is respected

ALDE Press Release, 25 October 2006. [Link](#)

Following an initiative by the ALDE [liberal democratic] Group, a resolution was adopted on 25 October 2006 during the plenary session in Strasbourg which raised the issue of Anna Politkovskaya's murder.

The leader of the ALDE Group, Graham Watson stated: "My group salutes President Borrell and Prime Minister Vanhanen and the other Prime Ministers who raised the issue of Anna Politkovskaya's murder". Leader of the ALDE Group, Graham Watson added that "The European Union should sign no partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia until freedom, transparency and the rule of law are established, along with the legal certainty for investors that flows from them".

EP motions for a resolution, initiated by the ALDE Group:

- [on the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya](#)
- [on Moldova \(Transnistria\)](#)
- [on Georgia \(South Ossetia\)](#)

Russia's soft power ambitions

Nicu Popescu, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 115, October 2006. [Link to full article](#)

The European Union thinks of itself as a "soft power", which in Joseph Nye's definition is the "ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion" and this power can "be cultivated through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges" (Nye 2005). But few would think that Russia has "soft power" ambitions as well. The truth is that Russia has started to invest in the infrastructure of a soft power. It is developing a new ideology of "sovereign democracy", and is developing tools to ensure ideological dominance not only inside Russia, but in its "near abroad" as well.

The first front for Russia's new soft power ambition is domestic. Putin's administration, represented by its deputy chief Vladislav Surkov, has been working on the development of "sovereign democracy" as a concept which should be the backbone of Russia's "national idea". It is not easy to grasp what "sovereign democracy" means exactly. The concept is deliberately vague and speculative, and the debate still ongoing. However, its core idea is that Russia has its own set of values. These values are democratic, but they emerge from Russia's unique historic experience, and they are distinctive from what the West understands as democracy. As Sergei Ivanov, Russia's defence minister puts it "if there is western democracy, there should be an eastern democracy as well" (Newsru.com, 12 July 2004). In addition the emphasis on "sovereign democracy" was meant as a counter-example to post-revolutionary Ukraine and Georgia, which in Moscow's views are ruled from the outside.

On paper the ideology of "sovereign democracy" is probably not different from what is understood in the West by democracy. But the reality of "sovereign democracy" is different. The rule of law, protection of minorities, a free press, a viable

political opposition, or legally guaranteed property rights are not part of the reality of a "sovereign democracy". From the jailing of Khodorkovsky, to the assassination of Politkovskaya, from the witch hunts against Georgians or North Caucasians (after Beslan), to problems with Western Businesses on Sakhalin, the reality of "sovereign democracy" raises many questions.

The idea of "sovereign democracy" has a number of functions. First is to provide Putin's authoritarianism with respectable "democratic" clothes in order to strengthen it internally and insulate from international criticism. Second, is to challenge the West's idea of democracy and human rights as a set of universal values and practices. Even the Russian Orthodox Church is involved in the project. The central question of a high profile and much-publicised congress of the Russian Church was "Are Western standards of human happiness applicable to all countries and cultures?" The answer is a clear no. In the words of the Church's main ideologue Miropolit Kirill Russia should develop its own version of what human rights are and promote it internationally in order to oppose the West's "dictatorial stance" that all other traditions "must be silenced and subdued" (Patriarchia.ru, 4 April 2006).

A second front for Russia's new ideological drive is external. Russia's "sovereign democracy" is not just about deflecting criticism from the West, but also about extending this "sovereignty" to Russia's neighbours, and deny them their own "sovereignty". Nikolai Patrushev, Russia's head of Federal Security Service (FSB) states that "Non-governmental organizations must not be allowed to engage in any activity they like... We are interested in unifying the respective laws of the Community of Independent States into clear legislation on the activity of NGOs. The NGOs must be told what problems they should tackle and for what purpose and they should engage in activity of that kind... The Constitution and laws must be changed before the wave of orange revolutions spread to the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States." (New-times.ru, July 2005).

Russia's way to consolidate its political regime and strengthen its dominance in its neighbours is not only coercive, but also creative and pro-active. Gas prices and trade embargoes are not the only tools to extend Russian influence. Russia invests in the development of NGO infrastructure, supports media outlets, youth movements, internet websites (www.russiaprofile.org, www.regnum.ru and many others), expert networks (www.kreml.org), regular conferences (www.europeforum.info) and even a publishing house (called "Evropa"). In the South Caucasus a so called "Caucasus Institute for Democracy" with active branches in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia has been very active recently. In Moldova a "Free Europe-Moldova" Foundation was launched. In Ukraine a "Eurasian Union of Youth" (www.rossia3.ru) has been active in anti-NATO campaigns. The Russian authorities have been boosting a CIS elections monitoring organisation (CIS-EMO) whose verdicts for elections conducted in the CIS have always been diametrically opposed to OSCE verdicts.

It is not difficult to see that such outlets are part of the same network. They have links to each other, and same faces, commentaries and ideas are simultaneously advanced by such outlets. They also make a heavy use of such words as democracy,

Europe, freedom etc and have nothing to do with these notions. It is just a new emerging type of "smart authoritarianism."

Commission Communication on External Energy Relations

Brussels, 12 October 2006. [Link](#)

[Extract]

External energy relations – from principles to action

The European Council of March 2006 endorsed the Commission Green Paper's proposed objectives for an energy policy for Europe - long-term sustainability, security of energy supply and economic competitiveness, in line with the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs. The June 2006 European Council subsequently adopted a set of recommendations proposed jointly by the Commission and the High Representative/Secretary General of the Council .

[...]

(3) EU-Russia energy cooperation is crucial in ensuring energy security on the European continent. Russia is already the origin of around 25% of oil and gas consumed in the EU. The growing demand for energy, in particular gas, points to even higher volumes of energy imports from Russia. The foreseen negotiations on a new comprehensive framework agreement within the post-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) offer an opportunity to agree on the objectives and principles of energy cooperation in a balanced and mutually binding manner. This would not only have an impact on the conditions for EU-Russia trade and investment in the energy sector, but would also extend across the economy, thus supporting the industrial diversification and technological development that Russia seeks. It would also bring benefits to transit and producer countries in Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Such an agreement with Russia, confirming both market economy principles and the relevant principles of the Energy Charter Treaty, could also remove many of the current obstacles to Russia's eventual ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty.

With the current levels of investment in production, transport and distribution of energy products, concerns have been expressed that Russia may not be able adequately to satisfy the growing demand on both its export and domestic markets. There should, therefore, be a strong joint effort to improve the energy efficiency of the Russian economy. For this to become possible, framework conditions regulating and fostering energy trade and cross investments between the EU and Russia would be required. Linked to this, the EU should develop its cooperation with Russia in implementing Kyoto commitments, to foster technical innovation and improve the efficiency of the energy sector.

The EU and Russia should see mutual long term benefits from a new energy partnership, which would seek a balance between expectations and interests of both sides. The equation is the following:

(a) Russia seeks ways to secure energy demand presented

by the EU market. The EU needs Russian resources for its energy security. There is a clear interdependence.

(b) Russia wants a stronger presence in the EU internal energy market, ensured long term gas supply contracts, the integration of electricity grids and free trade for electricity and nuclear materials, as well as the acquisition and control of downstream EU energy assets (gas and electricity) and EU investments and technology for the development of the Russian energy resources.

(c) The EU wants non-discriminatory and fair treatment from Russia in their energy relationship, in terms of supply from Russia and in terms of access to the Russian market for EU investors; a level playing field in terms of market conditions, investment and acquisitions in the upstream and downstream Russian energy infrastructure and resources; third party access to pipelines within Russia, including those for transit of energy products from the Caspian region and Central Asia; respect for competition rules as well as high levels of environmental security and safety.

In its proposal for negotiating directives for a new framework agreement with Russia, the Commission has suggested how our energy relationship with Russia could be enhanced. Closer ties with Russia should seek to eliminate remaining barriers to trade and investment, promote regulatory convergence and facilitate the sharing of technology, thus widening and deepening our energy relationship. Mutual benefits for the long term could be anchored through creating a level playing field, predictability and reciprocity in terms of:

(a) upstream and downstream, domestic and foreign investment;

(b) market opening, and fair and non-discriminatory access to transport networks, including for purposes of transit of energy products;

(c) convergence of energy policies, legislation and regulations regarding the functioning of markets, including trade rules, as well as safety and security issues;

(d) compliance with the high standards of EU regulations concerning the safety, security and environmental aspects, in particular for the purpose of electricity trade, as well as respect for competition rules;

(e) joint implementation of energy efficiency and savings, renewables and research measures.

It is essential that Member States have a common understanding on the proposed approach on the principles for a future energy partnership with Russia, to be considered in the framework of the post-PCA agreement. The Union should use all opportunities to convince Russia of the mutual interest in such an exercise.

Informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government, Lahti, FinlandTranscript of Press Conference, 21 October 2006. [Link](#)

[Extract]

EU-Russia relations

Putin: Now, the focus of the discussion has been the strengthening of our strategic partnership between the EU and Russia. We are very determined to build up a solid and mutually beneficial relationship rooted in common values, common interests. In the near future, we are going to develop a new basic document which will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which will have run its course by the end of this year. Given the new level of our relations and its prospects, we have suggested to call the new agreement a Strategic Partnership Agreement. Even the title itself and the contents would need to be thrashed out through negotiations.

During the summit, we also discussed matters of energy cooperation between the EU and Russia. It is quite clear that the EU and Russia are natural partners in this field. And our mutual dependence only contributes to the overall energy security on the European continent and creates good premises to get closer in other areas. Incidentally, I drew the attention of our colleagues that whereas in terms of gas, European Union covers 44% of its demand through Russian supplies, in the Russian export structure 67% are supplied to the EU. So, that goes to show that Russia is more dependent on the EU today than the other way around.

The EU leaders and Russia have reiterated their conviction that the energy cooperation is to be rooted on principles of predictability of the energy markets and the mutual dependence of the suppliers and consumers, and the protection of the vital energy infrastructure.

EU-Russia & Energy

DPA, German Press Agency: Question to Mr Putin. Are you willing and ready to include the question of energy into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or is this something that you would not want to have in the agreement that is to be discussed? Thank you.

Putin (through interpreter): I thought you were going to make a political remark now. I'm really quite taken aback that you asked this serious question that is not that easy to address. We are engaged in the energy dialogue with the European Union for the past few years and within the framework of this dialogue, we are trying to identify common approaches. We would very much like to see that our cooperation in this field would be not merely mutually beneficial but rooted in identical principles and approaches. Or perhaps I would anticipate some of your questions and I will tell you about the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol thereto. We are not against the principles laid down in the Energy Charter but we believe that certain provisions need to be further specified, or a different document needs to be developed on the basis of the same principles as the Energy Charter because, with that taken on board, the interests of all partners, the cooperation cannot

be long-term, cannot be solid. Particularly following today's summit, I am quite confident that we will be in a position to develop such common approaches with our European partners. We will incorporate them in the new document. We don't know if it's going to be a separate document. It's too premature to discuss it because we haven't started to open it yet. But we would not be against incorporating these principles, although, apart from energy, we also have hi-tech, airspace, biology etc. We can't incorporate all of these sectoral issues into a basic document regulating the relationship between the EU and Russia. But, in order to attain common principles in the field of energy, this is our determination. We believe that, even with respect to those matters which are the subject of dispute today, we will reach accord.

Financial Times Deutschland: I've a question for President Putin. There were three developments in Russia recently. One is the fact... the difficulties that Shell encountered and the Sakhalin II project. The second one is that no foreign company will be exploring, together with the Russian companies, the Shtokman fields. And the third was the definition of so-called specific sectors in the Russian economy in which foreign companies cannot invest without the approval of the Russian state. So that has created the impression among western companies that they are unwelcome in Russia and that the legal surroundings are changing without being predictable. What would you reply to that? Thank you.

Putin (through interpreter): Yes indeed, our law has been developing rapidly but that development has been aimed at improving the investment climate rather worsening it. Our law, and the latest changes as well as the new draft plans – incidentally [we] have addressed this question today, when the German Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, asked the same question – that we have the draft laws now being handled by the Duma are aimed at guaranteeing any foreign investment in the Russian economy, at ensuring ownership rights and in order to minimise the sectors where foreign capital cannot be used. These fields are going to be limited mainly to security-related fields. Incidentally, even here we intend to radically reduce them, as well as by the largest unique deposits, which can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Everything else will be open. I reiterate: the overall thrust of the decisions we take is to ensure the right to investors. With respect to Sakhalin... No, I'll start with Shtokman: it has nothing to do with the changed rules of operation in Russia. Nothing has changed. Gazprom has declared its intent to involve foreign partners. Foreign partners have tabled a proposal. Gazprom has analysed the proposal and took a decision to the effect that they were not happy with it. Because what was involved was the exchange of shares and nobody could offer adequate shares because Shtokman is a very large deposit, so Gazprom declared that it will be the sole developer, but it does not mean that Russia rejects cooperation with foreign partners. They can be involved as co-executors, to solve management issues, as well technical implementation. Now a few words about Sakhalin II. I think that the issue boils down to primarily making sure that environmental requirements are met. We have well known examples – recent examples – in Alaska, where the US Congress banned BP from exploring, for environmental reasons. We haven't banned anybody as yet. Now foreign investment in the Russian economy and the energy sector keep growing, to the tune of dozens of billions of dollars but, apart from the need to meet environmental requirement, there are

other issues with respect the Sakhalin II. Our partners wanted to double their costs. What it boils down to for Russia, under the production-sharing agreements, will not see any profits before all the costs have been recouped. We haven't seen any profits so far even though oil has been produced for a number of years, and that would linger on. The legal costs have almost doubled, the foreign staff salaries have been almost doubled. [Not clear] costs have been almost doubled. We agreed that Russian staff would be used by 70%. It hasn't even been used by 50%, so all of these issues have been hidden by these scandals, inflated by those who are trying to hide commercial issues. I believe there are no unsolvable issues. We just need to sit down to an negotiating table. I'm sure we'll identify solutions.

Russia - Georgia

YLE, Finnish Broadcasting Company: My question is to President Putin. EU countries, EU leaders have expressed their concern about the current situation between Russia and Georgia here at the meeting. And you also talked about it with our President Halonen on your way here. What was your answer to these concerns? And how do you see the situation can be solved, without it getting worse?

Putin (through interpreter): Yes indeed, we have spent quite a lot of time discussing that, and my colleagues asked me to comment on the latest developments between Russia and Georgia. My answer to both themselves and to the media is very simple: that the issue does not lie in the relationship between Russia and Georgia. The issue is between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And to our great regret, and great concern, the way this situation is developing, it is heading for a disaster, for bloodshed because the Georgian leadership is seeking to restore its [not clear] through military means and they are quite open about that. Well, let's call a spade a spade. What are we discussing here? Small nations, very small nations in the Caucasus. In Ossetia, you have only about 70 000 population, but you have 40 000 refugees. In Abkhazia, the population is only about 150 000, which is an entity much smaller than Georgia itself. So that is the tragedy, that is the trouble, that is what you need to be afraid of, and avoid: bloodshed in the area. It has nothing to do with Russia's evil machinations. Back in the last century, from 1917 to 1920, there were three military campaigns to which Ossetians refer to these days as ethnic cleansing. That gave rise to a very difficult relationship between these nations, so what we need is patience. We need cautiously to try to restore trust and build a common state. This is what are calling for, this is what we want. And so we hope that will be understood, and that bloodshed will be avoided. This is the root cause. I have the impression that we are being deliberately led away to stress other aspects of this discussion. This is what I would like to stress, for your benefit, above all. As soon as we have a different relationship between Georgia, Akhazia and South Ossetia, the Russia-Georgia relationship would also be normalised. Don't try to blame us for what we can't do or by definition. Because in the post-Soviet space, we have a quite a few frozen conflicts. And no matter who I'm talking to, I stress that Russia cannot assume this responsibility. This is the responsibility of these nations themselves, to reach an agreement, to find compromise.

Izvestiya (through interpreter): [A question] addressed to Mr Putin: Mr Saakashvili claims he is ready for dialogue. Do you

intend to take any measures whatsoever vis-à-vis Georgia?

Putin (through interpreter): Well, I believe that I have already addressed the question of Russia and Georgia. If that was not sufficient, I'll try to explain more. I believe that the initiative to worsen the relations originated not from Russia. That has been done, in my view, in order to create favourable political and information background for the potential solution of the Abkhazia [unclear] problem through force, through bloodshed. We are urging all of you to pay attention to that fact, and to do your best to avoid that, to prevent that. Secondly, since we did not initiate the worsening in our inter-state relations, we are quite happy to see signals manifest... would welcome any signals that Georgia is prepared to improve our relations.

The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions

Alan Riley, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 116, October 2006. [Link](#)

Conclusion: Not Quite Mutual Dependency

One of the strangest features of the debates on Russian gas supplies is that Russia is often portrayed in the Western media as an all-powerful energy superpower. It is not. In fact Russia and the EU are locked into a sort of mutual dependency. Russia's pipelines all point in one direction, toward the European Union, and the EU is by far the richest market for Russian gas. The EU is the profitable market for Russian gas. Equally, the EU is dependent on Russia. However, in this mutually dependent relationship the EU is not quite mutually dependent. Russia really has nowhere else to sell its gas and certainly no other such rich market. The EU by contrast has the financial capacity to make other arrangements. There is in fact plenty of gas in the world, it can be shipped in by LNG and alternative fuels to gas can be employed. The EU acting in concert has the means to offer Russia a convincing powerful future for its gas industry. However, it also has the means, if Russia refuses the offer to walk away and to reduce Russia to the supplier of last resort. For the EU to be so effective and powerful it would have to act together and also appreciate the strength of its position in any negotiations with Russia. The tendency with the EU is for individual member states is to cut individual deals with Russia. However, the predicament of Germany, dependent on Russian gas supplies but without the power to reform Russia's dysfunctional gas market-is a standing warning to all member states of the dangers of energy bilateralism.

If the EU and its member states are going to be able to head off this looming energy crisis they need to learn to act collectively and will the institutional means for collective action.

NATO offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia

NATO Press Release, 21 September 2006. [Link](#)

At the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York, 21 September, the NATO Secretary General announced the decision to offer Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

In the context of Intensified Dialogue, Georgia will have access to a more intense political exchange with NATO Allies on its membership aspirations and relevant reforms, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision on a further

membership process.

Such consultations take place at different levels, from staff talks between the NATO Secretariat and Georgian authorities to high-level political consultations between Georgia and the North Atlantic Council.

Georgia will continue to implement its Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. This Plan will remain the key programme of defence and institutional reform in Georgia. NATO countries will continue to assess Georgia's progress in the implementation of the objectives set out in that document. The formula of 'Intensified Dialogue' has its roots in the 1997 Madrid Summit, at which NATO Heads of State and Government decided "to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions."

These dialogues "cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision."

NATO is also engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine.

Statement of the Presidents of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, 5 October 2006

5 October 2006. [Link](#)

The developments of the situation around Georgia stir our concern and anxiety. We call upon both sides to show restraint and calm, to refrain from mutual accusations, to proceed to dialogue and negotiations. The use of threats and the absence of readiness for concessions could lead only to further worsening of the situation.

With the satisfaction we mark the efforts by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. K. De Gucht, Finland's Foreign Minister Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, whose country holds the EU presidency, as well as by other representatives of international community, which assist in solving the problem. We are convinced that their involvement could serve as the main factor that would make possible the settlement of the conflicts on the territory of Georgia for ensuring sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of this country.

Every conflict may be settled through the negotiations, in which we are ready to take part as mediators.

The President of the Republic of Lithuania
VALDAS ADAMKUS
The President of the Republic of Poland
LEKH KACHINSKY
The President of Ukraine
VICTOR YUSHCHENKO

UN Security Council Resolution 1716 (2006) on Georgia

13 October 2006. [Link](#)

The Security Council,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1666 of 31 March 2006 (S/RES/1666),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia of 28 September 2006,

Supporting the sustained efforts of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, as well as of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and of the OSCE,

Regretting the continued lack of progress on key issues of a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict,

Acknowledging with concern the observation of the Secretary-General that a new and tense situation has emerged between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides, in particular as a result of the Georgian special operation in the upper Kodori Valley,

1. Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, and supports all efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General which are guided by their determination to promote a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict only by peaceful means and within the framework of the Security Council resolutions;
2. Recalls, with a view to achieving a lasting and comprehensive settlement, its support for the principles contained in the "Paper on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" and welcomes additional ideas that the sides would be willing to offer with a view to conducting creatively and constructively a political dialogue under the aegis of the United Nations;
3. Having in mind the relevant Security Council resolutions containing an appeal to both sides to refrain from any action that might impede the peace process, expresses its concern with regard to the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Valley in July 2006, and to all violations of the Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces of 14 May 1994, and other Georgian-Abkhaz agreements concerning the Kodori Valley;
4. Urges the Georgian side to ensure that the situation in the upper Kodori Valley is in line with the Moscow agreement and that no troops unauthorized by this agreement are present;
5. Notes with satisfaction the resumption of joint patrols in the upper Kodori Valley by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force and reaffirms that such joint patrols should be conducted on a regular basis;
6. Urges both parties to comply fully with previous agreements and understandings regarding ceasefire, non-use of violence

and confidence-building measures, and stresses the need to strictly observe the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and the Separation of Forces in the air, on the sea and on land, including in the Kodori Valley;

7. Acknowledges the important role of the CIS peacekeeping force and of UNOMIG in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, stresses the importance of close and effective cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play a stabilizing role in the conflict zone, looks to all sides to continue to extend the necessary cooperation to them and recalls that a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict will require appropriate security guarantees;

8. Once again urges the Georgian side to address seriously legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant rhetoric and provocative actions, especially in upper Kodori Valley;

9. Urges the Abkhaz leadership to address seriously the need for a dignified return of IDPs and refugees, including their security and human rights concerns, publicly reassure the local population, particularly in the Gali district, that their residency rights and identity will be respected, and move without delay on implementing past commitments relating to United Nations police advisers, a United Nations human rights sub-office and the language of instruction;

10. Urges both parties to finalize without delay the package of documents on the non-use of violence and on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons for the Gali district and to undertake necessary steps to secure the protection and dignity of the civilian population including the returnees;

11. Commends the presentation by both sides of ideas as a basis for dialogue and calls on the two sides to resume this dialogue by using all existing mechanisms as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to come to a peaceful settlement;

12. Calls on both parties to follow up on their expressed readiness for a meeting of their highest authorities without preconditions and to maintain open channels of communication to build confidence, and encourages further contacts between representatives of civil society;

13. Calls on the Secretary-General to explore with the sides ways and means to build confidence, in particular by improving welfare and security of the inhabitants of Gali and Zugdidi districts;

14. Supports all efforts by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to engage constructively in economic cooperation as envisaged in the Geneva meetings and complemented by the working groups established in Sochi in March 2003, including, security conditions permitting, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and welcomes the intention expressed by Germany to host a meeting on economic cooperation and confidence-building measures, pending progress in the conflict resolution process;

15. Underlines that it is the primary responsibility of both sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and other

international personnel and calls on both sides to fulfil their obligations in this regard;

16. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by UNOMIG to implement the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

17. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 15 April 2007;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to include detailed information on developments in the Kodori Valley and on the progress on efforts for return of refugees and IDPs particularly to the Gali district into his next report on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia;

19. Strongly supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and calls on the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General to continue giving him their steadfast and unified support;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

EU Foreign Ministers Council Conclusions on Georgia/Russian Federation relations
Luxembourg, 16-17 October 2006. [Link](#)

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council reiterates the European Union's grave concern at the recent escalation of tension in Georgia-Russian Federation relations. The Council emphasises the importance of toning down public rhetoric and calls upon both sides to reopen normal diplomatic dialogue in order to work towards a normalisation of relations.

2. The Council welcomes the useful efforts of the Foreign Ministers' Troika, the High Representative, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in helping to facilitate the return of the Russian detainees.

3. The Council expresses its grave concern at the measures adopted by the Russian Federation against Georgia and at their economic, political and humanitarian consequences. The Council urges the Russian Federation not to pursue measures targeting Georgians in the Russian Federation. It calls on both parties to act in a manner consistent with their international commitments and obligations.

4. The Council recalls the European Union's wish to develop further its strategic partnership with the Russian Federation as well as its aim to deepen relations with Georgia in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this context, the Council reiterates the EU's willingness to work with Georgia and the Russian Federation to facilitate mutual

confidence building and contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The European Union also looks forward to work closely with Georgia and the Russian Federation in promoting prosperity and stability in the region.

5. The Council calls on both parties to focus on reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with full respect for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council calls upon the parties to comply fully with previous agreements and understandings regarding these conflicts, in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1716.

'Frozen Conflicts': Transnistria, South-Ossetia, and the Russian-Georgian dispute

Speech by EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero Waldner, Strasbourg, 25 October 2006. [Link](#)

Honourable Members, happy to be here. Since we last discussed, there have been substantial developments in several of the 'frozen conflicts' concerning Moldova and the South Caucasus. I am aware of your active interest in these issues and appreciate the opportunity for discussion today.

As you will be aware I visited the South Caucasus in early October when the ENP Action Plans with all three countries were finalised. We now have a strong, operational basis for closer cooperation.

Before I talk about the EU's support, it is important to recall the impact of relations with Russia: during recent months we have seen gas price increases for Moldova, import bans on Moldovan and Georgian wines and water; the de facto support given to Transnistria on the referendum, and the strong reaction to the Georgian expulsion of Russian military officers.

These issues were addressed with president Putin at the dinner on the occasion of the informal European Summit in Lahti and I raised these issues with Foreign Minister Lavrov only a few days ago. The forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Permanent Partnership Council on 3 November and the EU – Russia Summit in Helsinki on 24 November will also enable further discussion.

Let me also mention the OSCE and the helpful role it has played by refusing to observe and recognise the referendum in Transnistria, and its important role in returning the Russian officers to their authorities.

Now let me mention some specific examples of the EU's support to the region:

On Moldova/Transnistria, I would like to highlight the successful EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) which has played an important role in the introduction of a New Customs Regime between Moldova and Ukraine. This programme was allocated 20 million euros for two years and over 70 customs officials and border guards were seconded from EU member states.

All major Transnistrian companies have now registered in Chisinau and are working under this new regime. Combating

customs fraud will crucially cut the illicit revenue currently enjoyed by the Transnistrian leadership.

We have been concerned about Russia's support to the Transnistria leadership and therefore strongly welcome the resumption of talks between Russia and Moldova. We were also worried that the new Ukrainian Government would change track on this issue - I was therefore very pleased when PM Yanokovich assured me of his ongoing support. We will continue to stress the importance of Ukrainian co-operation.

Under the new ENPI instrument, Moldova will see a substantial increase in EC funding. It will also receive a grant under the macro-financial assistance programme to help address shocks caused by increased energy prices and the Russian ban on Moldovan wines.

On Russia/Georgia relations, We are very concerned about the crisis between Georgia and Russia. GAERC conclusions of October 17th called on both parties to act in line with their international commitments and obligations.

We are particularly concerned by the expulsion of large numbers of Georgians from Russian territory which appears in direct contradiction to Russia's commitments to the European Convention on Human Rights, and to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. I have raised this issue with Mr Lavrov.

Georgia has its share of responsibility. During my recent visit to Georgia I urged President Saakashvili to apply moderation, and encouraged him to rebuild trust.

On South Ossetia It is disappointing that the recent meeting of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) for S. Ossetia was inconclusive. We understand Georgia's wish for reviewing the Joint Control Commission's composition, but existing peace mechanisms should be fully utilized until new ones are in place.

The recent Needs Assessment Study and the June 2006 international donors' conference show there is scope for constructive dialogue. We are pleased this rehabilitation programme continues despite the crisis.

The Commission has made a significant financial contribution to support a peaceful settlement, including a 9.5 million euro economic rehabilitation programme in South Ossetia. Funds for rehabilitation have also been earmarked under the new EC financial assistance programme for 2007-10.

The EU has an important role in supporting any peace settlement. But the most immediate need is to get relations between Russia and Georgia back on track. The Commission will continue to support these efforts.

European Parliament resolution on the situation in South Ossetia

Strasbourg, 26 October 2006. [Link](#)

The European Parliament , – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 14 October 2004 ,

- having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2006 on the European Neighbourhood Policy ,
- having regard to its recommendation to the Council of 26 February 2004 on EU policy towards the South Caucasus and to its resolution of 26 May 2005 on EU-Russia relations ,
- having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 July 1999,
- having regard to the Presidency declaration of 20 July 2006 on recent developments in Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
- having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting of 16-17 October 2006,
- having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the situation in South Ossetia is deteriorating, with incidents, shootouts and clashes between Georgian and Ossetian forces and police units in recent months causing deaths and injuries,

B. whereas the Government and Parliament of Georgia have questioned the existing format of the negotiating process, the composition of the peacekeeping forces and the mechanisms of the peacekeeping operations stemming from the ceasefire agreement of 1992,

C. whereas the two sides have put forward two separate peace plans which contain many common elements that could and should be used as a basis for fruitful negotiations; whereas the Joint Control Commission (JCC) has lately proved incapable of producing significant results,

D. whereas the Russian Federation, by issuing passports to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is complicating the process of peaceful conflict resolution in the conflict zones in Georgia,

E. whereas South Ossetia decided to hold a referendum on self-determination together with the presidential election on 12 November 2006,

F. whereas Georgia has moved to the stage of "Intensified Dialogue" with NATO with a view to becoming a full member of that organisation,

G. deeply worried at the diplomatic crisis between Georgia and Russia following the recent arrests of four officers from Russia's military intelligence service by the Georgian counterintelligence services on allegations of espionage and the subsequent recall of the Russian ambassador to Moscow for consultations,

H. whereas on 2 October 2006 the Russian authorities interrupted all land, air and sea links with Georgia, including mail communications, although the four officers had been released to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and are now back in Russia,

I. whereas a number of seriously discriminatory measures have been taken by the Russian authorities against Georgians living in Russia on the grounds of their ethnicity, including the deportation of nearly 700 Georgians from Moscow to Tbilisi and the alleged harassment of Georgian worshippers,

businessmen and schoolchildren under the pretext of a clampdown on organised crime and illegal immigrants,

J. whereas in early 2006 the Russian Federation imposed a ban on the import of agricultural products (wine, fruit and vegetables) from Moldova and Georgia, which is considerably harming the economic development of both countries,

K. whereas the unilateral movements for independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not being supported by any international organisation and continuing efforts are being made under the auspices of the OSCE and the United Nations to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia,

L. whereas the EU must increase its support for the ongoing efforts to resolve the conflicts in Georgia and the South Caucasus region, in cooperation with the OSCE and other parties,

1. Reiterates its call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and its commitment to support the peace process, and calls on all parties to act responsibly by refraining from unilateral steps and inflammatory and aggressive statements which serve to exacerbate the situation and may degenerate into violence;

2. Reaffirms its full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and calls on the Russian authorities to fully respect the sovereignty of that country within its internationally recognised borders;

3. Strongly condemns the attempts by movements in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to establish independence unilaterally;

4. Calls on the Government of the Russian Federation to withhold support from all of these movements and to give its fullest support to the multilateral efforts to find a solution to the conflicts in its neighbourhood;

5. Condemns the fact that South Ossetia will hold a referendum on independence on 12 November 2006, and reminds the parties that a similar referendum on independence in 1992 was not internationally recognised;

6. Notes that the stagnated peace process needs to be relaunched, and calls for an enhanced and combined effort by the European Union and the OSCE to bring the parties back to the negotiating table, based on the progress made in the initial stages of the two peace plans;

7. Calls, in that connection, on both parties to sign the joint document on refraining from the use of force and on security guarantees and to engage in constructive negotiations in order to overcome the present stalemate; regrets the fact that the meeting of the JCC, which took place in Vladikavkaz on 12-13 October 2006, did not yield any results;

8. Takes the view that the full demilitarisation of, and a reduction in the number of weapons in, the conflict area, with the exception of the OSCE joint peacekeeping force, is a fundamental element of conflict prevention and a first essential step towards further confidence-building measures; therefore calls on Russia to refrain from holding military exercises and displaying any kind of military force in close proximity to

Georgia's territorial waters;

9. Stresses that neutral, effective and impartial peacekeeping operations are essential for resolving territorial conflicts in Georgia; looks with interest, in that connection, to new proposals concerning the existing tripartite joint peacekeeping force deployed in the conflict area around the ceasefire line between Georgia and South Ossetia; points out that a new force should incorporate an element of police support, to combat crime and lawlessness; stresses that the EU should be prepared, if necessary, to commit troops to a new peacekeeping force;

10. Considers it unfair and discriminatory that South Ossetian citizens holding Russian passports can travel to the EU more easily than Georgians, a state of affairs which contributes to increased tensions over the South Ossetian region and acts as a disincentive to a settlement of the dispute;

11. Calls on the Russian state authorities to halt immediately all acts of repression and harassment carried out and all accusations made by representatives of official state institutions against ethnic Georgians living in Russia;

12. Calls on the Russian authorities to rescind all the measures recently taken against Georgia and against the Georgian population on its territory; calls, further, on the Russian authorities to lift their unjustified import ban on products from Moldova and Georgia;

13. Calls on Russia to accept the realities which emerged after the end of the Cold War and to abandon outdated thinking about exclusive zones of influence;

14. Calls on the Council to keep on making every effort to defuse the tension and rebuild confidence between Georgia and the Russian Federation and prevent the present diplomatic crisis from escalating further; urges the Council and the Commission to find ways to help Georgia overcome and counterbalance the economic and social repercussions of the measures taken in Moscow;

15. Calls on the Council and the Commission to include the question of frozen conflicts and their resolution on the agenda for the next EU-Russia summits;


16. Welcomes the conclusion and the signing of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan for Georgia; expects that the implementation thereof will give a further boost to the political and reform process in that country; welcomes the statements by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, who recently said that the EU intends to become more actively engaged in the resolution of conflicts in Georgia, and calls on the Council to provide the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus with all the necessary means and resources to make this action more effective and visible;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, , the President and Parliament of Georgia, the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation and the de facto authorities in South Ossetia and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OSCE.

Poll on Russian attitudes towards Georgian nationals

Russian Federation, October 2006.

Question: **Do you approve of the increased inspections and closure of Georgian-owned companies, restaurants and casinos?**



Source: Levada Center, Poll carried out in October 2006. Retrieved from article: "Putin stirs nationalists", by Guy Chazan, The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2006.

Instruction from the Russian Ministry of Interior to schools in Moscow to supply information on schoolchildren of Georgian nationality

Moscow, October 2006.

Unofficial Translation:

In order to insure law and order and observe legality, as well to prevent terrorist acts and aggressive sentiments between children of the Moscow inhabitants and children of Georgian nationality, I request you to submit to the Taganski OVD of Moscow (local department of the ministry of interior) the following information:

- name, surname, date and place of birth, place of residence of the children of Georgian nationality, the form in which they study;
- name, surname, date and place of birth, place of residence of their parents, place of work, position at work, composition of the family;
- relations between the children of Georgian nationality with other pupils, cases of hostile relations between the children, as well as towards these children, facts of disobedience of the Georgian children vis-a-vis teachers, facts of antisocial behaviour, facts of unlawful actions.

This information should be forwarded before 09.10.2006 to the following address: Moscow, Vedernikov pereulok, 9.

OVD chief of the Taganski district of Moscow
Colonel of militia G.S. Zakharov

Official Document:

В целях обеспечения правопорядка и соблюдения законности, предотвращения террористических актов и агрессивных настроений между детьми жителями Москвы и детьми грузинской национальности, прошу предоставить в ОВД Таганского р-на г. Москвы следующую информацию:

- Ф.И.О., дата и место рождения и жительства детей грузинской национальности, в каком классе обучается,
- Ф.И.О., дата и место рождения и жительства родителей, место работы и должность, состав семьи,
- Взаимоотношения детей грузинской национальности с другими учениками, случаи неприязненных отношений между детьми, так и по отношению к ним, факты неповиновения грузинских детей учителям, факты штиобщественных действий, противоправных деяний.

Данную информацию прошу направить в наш адрес: до 09.10.2006 года (г. Москва, Ведерников переулок д.9).

Начальник ОВД/
Таганского района
г. Москвы
полковник милиции



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Low price for natural gas depends on Kiev agreeing to a package of Moscow's economic and political demands

by Oleg Gavrish, Kommersant, Moscow, 20 October 2006.
[Link](#)

Kommersant has learned from sources in the government and in Gazprom that Moscow expects to complete gas negotiations successfully when the prime ministers of the two countries meet in Kiev on October 24.

The price of the natural gas will be under \$130 per 100 cubic meters, if Kiev agrees to a package of Moscow's demands, including economic and political demands.

During Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's visit to Kiev on October 24, conditions for the delivery of gas to Ukraine in 2007 will be discussed. A source close to Gazprom says that big hopes are being placed on that meeting.

A few days ago, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich said that draft federal budget had been written based on a gas price of \$130 per 1000 cu. m. and everything will be put in writing during the meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian trade and economic commission in Kiev on October 24. Fradkov will make a one-day visit to Kiev on that date.

Kommersant has learned that Moscow is offering Kiev a package deal. A high-placed source in the Ukrainian leadership says that Ukraine is promising several concessions to Russia in exchange for gas.

[1] The first is that a national referendum on NATO membership is to be held in the near future, which is intended to put an end to all thoughts of joining that organization.

[...]

[2] The second demand mentioned by the source is that Ukraine leave the Russian fleet based in Sevastopol alone until 2017, as they had agreed, and possibly even prolong the agreement.

Moscow and Kiev concluded a 20-year agreement on the Black Sea Fleet in 1997. But a scandal has been simmering around the fleet for more than a year now.

[3] The third condition on the deal is a Ukrainian guarantee to cooperate with Rosukrenergo for at least five years, as agreed on, without initiating a reconsideration of that agreement.

[4] Fourth, Kiev has to promise to receive gas from Turkmenistan exclusively through Russia.

[5] Finally, Ukrainian must not change the transit price for Russian gas.

Those proposals were discussed at the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Yanukovich in September.

EU-Ukraine Summit - Joint press statementHelsinki, 27 October 2006. [Link](#)

The 10th EU-Ukraine Summit took place in Helsinki on October 27th 2006. The EU was represented by the Finnish Prime Minister Mr Matti VANHANEN in his capacity as President of the European Council and by the President of the Commission, Mr José Manuel DURAO BARROSO. Prime Minister Vanhanen was accompanied by Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Erkki TUOMIOJA and Minister for European Affairs/Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Ms Paula LEHTOMÄKI. The President of the Commission was accompanied by the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Dr Benita FERRERO-WALDNER. The Ukrainian Delegation was led by the President Victor YUSHCHENKO accompanied by Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Boris TARASYUK.

The Summit was the first such meeting after the Parliamentary elections in March, 2006, and the formation of the new Ukrainian government in August. The elections showed that the consolidation of democracy and the freedom of speech had been key achievements of the past two years. These need to be safeguarded. Three main points on the agenda were developments in the EU and Ukraine, EU-Ukraine relations and international issues.

The European Union and Ukraine agreed on the crucial importance of political and economic reforms in Ukraine and on the need for Ukraine to finalise the WTO accession process which would allow the development of stronger economic and trade relations with the EU. The Parties agreed on a joint comprehensive and ambitious approach to the new Enhanced Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, including a deep free trade area as an important element thereof. Both Parties are looking forward to the launch of official negotiations early 2007. The Parties also welcomed progress made in reforms in all fields covered by the EU - Ukraine Action Plan and agreed on the need to continue the implementation of the Action Plan.

The Summit welcomed increasingly close co-operation in the area of foreign and security policy, in particular as regards issues of regional stability and crisis management. It welcomed the alignment of Ukraine with EU positions on regional and international issues. Ukrainian and EU leaders confirmed their continued commitment to constructive cooperation in order to achieve a sustainable, comprehensive and just settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The Summit also welcomed the initiatives of President Yushchenko, which had brought new impetus to the settlement process. The Parties took note of the effective work of the EU Border Assistance Mission on the border between Ukraine and Moldova as an example of mutually beneficial and successful EU-Ukraine cooperation. The importance of the continued implementation of the Joint Declaration by Ukraine and Moldova on customs was highlighted. The leaders also discussed the situation in Belarus and Ukrainian-Russian relations and welcomed the strengthening of EU-Ukraine Security and Defense co-operation. It was noted that the considerable needs Ukraine is facing in the area of destruction of outdated arms and ammunition call for a global and coherent approach. The EU's actions in this sector aim at helping Ukraine to enhance her

destruction capabilities.

The Summit took note of progress on the joint implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on energy co-operation. Significant work is being undertaken in cooperation with EU to enhance the security of energy supplies in Ukraine and the gas transit to the EU market. This includes cooperation for identifying options for reform of the Ukrainian gas transit system as well as the adoption by Ukraine of the EU legislation with respect to oil stocks, the electricity and gas sectors, the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline, the completion of the oil and gas Boyarka metrology centre, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources.

Joint efforts will continue in implementing several energy infrastructure projects in cooperation with the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development aiming in particular at enhancing the transparency of cross border energy flows, the improvement of the efficiency of gas infrastructure, the metering of domestic energy consumption, and electricity network interconnections.

The EU welcomed Ukraine's intention of acceding to the Energy Community Treaty when the necessary conditions are met.

The Parties welcomed the recent conclusion of the « horizontal » air services agreement between the European Community and Ukraine that ensures legal certainty for air operations between the EU and Ukraine. They emphasised the importance of strengthening aviation relations between both sides and welcomed the Ukrainian efforts to further integrate into European aviation structures. In that context, they underlined the significance of full membership of Ukraine in the Joint Aviation Authorities.

The Parties reaffirmed the importance of cooperation in the area of Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) and welcomed the progress that has been made in revising the EU - Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice.

The Summit welcomed the successful completion of negotiations on the EC-Ukraine visa facilitation and readmission agreements and initialed both documents.

The Summit took note of the recent signature of a Memorandum of Understanding on a structured dialogue on agricultural issues.

Ukraine's Choice: Toward Europeby Viktor Yanukovich, Prime Minister of Ukraine,
5 October 2006. [Link](#)

Throughout European history, my country, Ukraine, has been badly misunderstood in Western capitals. Until the middle of the past century, it was referred to as "the Okraina," literally the borderlands between European civilization and a distant and unfathomable Russia. There are perhaps many in Europe who still see us that way, but in fact things have changed in Ukraine, to an extent that surprises even those of us who played a part in bringing about those changes.

On Aug. 2, Ukraine's president, Viktor Yushchenko, and I, along with other political leaders, signed a statement of principles that we believe will serve as the foundation for modern Ukraine. This statement will provide a blueprint for the government and a guide to reforms to which we are committed. Among the key points:

Economic reform. Our citizens have been left behind by the economic "shock therapy" and subsequent wave of prosperity that has swept over Eastern Europe since 1989. We have seen what lowering taxes, securing private prosperity and liberalizing trade have done for our neighbors in Europe. Our government is going to be pro-business and committed to building an economy that will be competitive in world markets. Our first step on this path will be passage of legislation required for entry into the World Trade Organization.

Political pluralism. The powers of our government are divided fairly and are faithful to the results of our parliamentary elections in March. The party of Yushchenko – Our Ukraine – continues to hold the presidency and ministerial positions in foreign affairs, defense, interior and the National Security Council. My party, the Party of Regions, holds the prime ministerial post and the majority of ministerial posts overall (they are heavily focused on the economy). The leader of the Socialist Party, Oleksander Moroz, is speaker of the parliament and a member of the governing coalition. My political opponent Yulia Tymoshenko is head of the largest opposition bloc in parliament and is already a candidate in the 2009 presidential elections. Parliament may at times be more raucous than the U.S. Congress, but it is no less representative.

Constructive relations with Russia and, where possible, a broadening of cooperation. We believe that the core principle of both liberal trade theory and diplomacy is a respect for the political character and sovereign independence of other states. We believe these principles will guide our relations with Russia on a range of bilateral issues, including our discussions of energy security and cross-border investment.

President Yushchenko and I also agree that Ukraine has made a choice for Europe and will pursue closer relations with all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. With the European Union, we are working on an action plan of reforms under the auspices of the European Neighborhood Policy, which we hope will lead to the beginning of negotiations on an E.U.-Ukraine free-trade agreement. With the United States, we are developing an action plan of anti-corruption measures and judicial reform under a grant from the Millennium Challenge Corp. And we are committed to continuing active cooperation with NATO.

As our relations with NATO have been a source of some confusion, let me be clear. The president and I have secured legislation that allows Ukrainian troops to participate in NATO exercises, in Ukraine and elsewhere. We intend to pursue defense reforms. But when an invitation is extended, we will hold a referendum in which the Ukrainian people can make their choice. Whatever happens in this regard, however, there should be no doubting our nation's European direction.

Finally, Ukraine is and will remain a country of great diversity. We have the largest Jewish population in Europe. I have many close friends of the Islamic faith, and we have countless

Christian denominations, including at least three Orthodox ones.

Like Canada and Switzerland, we speak two languages, Ukrainian and Russian. I come from Eastern Ukraine, where the first language of the majority of people is Russian. This, too, has been a source of misunderstanding. Some have suggested that the cultural influence of Russia and the linguistic origins of people such as myself are proof that the Party of Regions is pro-Russian. It is not. The presence of Spanish-speaking Americans in the Republican and Democratic parties does not make those parties pro-Spain or "pro" any other country. By the same token, the American people should not think that my party, or for that matter any party in Ukrainian politics, is less than completely committed to the cultural unity and political independence of a sovereign Ukrainian nation.

Be assured, Europe and America need not look for Ukraine somewhere out on the borderlands anymore. After we have completed our reforms and built our economy, Ukraine will be found at the very center of the Euro-Atlantic world.

EU Foreign Ministers Council Conclusions on the Middle East

Luxembourg, 16-17 October 2006. [Link](#)

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

- Middle East Peace Process

The Council welcomed the statement by the Quartet at its meeting in New York on 20 September and, in particular, the Quartet's intention to reinforce its activity, including with the parties and regional partners. The Council recalled the urgent need to make progress towards a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the Roadmap, and with a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at its core. It welcomed the consensus within the international community to that effect. The Council underlined that the EU would continue actively its efforts to this end.

The Council expressed its support to President Abbas and called on the Palestinians to join his efforts towards national unity and the formation of a government with a platform reflecting the Quartet principles and allowing for early engagement. Such a government would also be a key factor for allowing the EU to pursue its goal of strengthening the capacity of Palestinian institutions. The Council called on all Palestinian factions to end their internal strife.

The Council underlined the importance of an early resumption of dialogue between the two parties with a view to re-launching negotiations on the basis of the Roadmap. The Council recalled the utmost importance of the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access, particularly the permanent opening of the Rafah, Karni and other crossings. The Council reiterated its call for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldier. It repeated its call for the immediate release of Palestinian Ministers and legislators in Israeli custody. It called for an end to violence and for restraint on both sides.

The Council welcomed the extension of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) for a further three months and the expansion of this mechanism to an even greater number of vulnerable people. It encouraged other donors to make full use of the mechanism. The Council reiterated its call for an immediate resumption of transfers of withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues by Israel. The Council further called on Israel to consider resumption of such transfers via the TIM to alleviate the deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza and the West Bank.

- LEBANON

The Council renewed its commitment to support the full implementation of UNSCR 1701. It welcomed the overall deployment in Southern Lebanon of the Lebanese Armed Forces, supported by UNIFIL. It noted the almost complete withdrawal of Israeli troops and called on Israel to withdraw also from the Lebanese part of the town of Ghajar in co-ordination with UNIFIL. The Council stressed that Lebanon's sovereignty over its land, sea and airspace must be respected. The Council called for the immediate release of the two

abducted Israeli soldiers.

The Council reiterated the EU's commitment to support the legitimate and democratically elected Lebanese government. The EU will continue to assist the Lebanese government in meeting its humanitarian and environmental needs and in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The EU will support the Lebanese government in further extending its authority throughout Lebanese territory, and in taking forward political, security, economic and social reforms. The Council recalled that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon. The Council called on all sides to observe the requirement of authorisation by the Lebanese government of sales and supply of arms. The Council called on all parties and neighbours to support this process.

* * *

The Council reaffirmed its full support for the UN International Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and other terrorist attacks as mandated by UNSCR 1595, 1644 and 1686. It commended the professional work made by Mr. Brammertz and his team under difficult circumstances, and welcomed the 5th report by UNIIIC. It expressed its confidence that progress will be achieved in bringing the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. It underlined the importance of establishing a tribunal of international character, in conformity with UNSCR 1664.

Prophet Muhammad's covenant to those who adopt Christianity

extract of the article "Is Islam tolerant?", by Hubertus Hoffmann, 20 October 2006. [Link](#)

In 628 A.D. Prophet Muhammad granted a Charter of Privileges to the monks of St. Catherine Monastery in Mt. Sinai.

It consisted of several clauses covering all aspects of human rights including such topics as the protection of Christians, freedom of worship and movement, freedom to appoint their own judges and to own and maintain their property, exemption from military service, and the right to protection in war:

"This is a message from Muhammad ibn Abdullah, as a covenant to those who adopt Christianity, near and far, we are with them.

Verily I, the servants, the helpers, and my followers defend them, because Christians are my citizens; and by Allah! I hold out against anything that displeases them.

No compulsion is to be on them.

Neither are their judges to be removed from their jobs nor their monks from their monasteries.

No one is to destroy a house of their religion, to damage it, or to carry anything from it to the Muslims' houses.

Should anyone take any of these, he would spoil God's covenant and disobey His Prophet.

Verily, they are my allies and have my secure charter against

all that they hate.

No one is to force them to travel or to oblige them to fight.

The Muslims are to fight for them.

If a female Christian is married to a Muslim it is not to take place without her approval. She is not to be prevented from visiting her church to pray.

Their churches are to be respected. They are neither to be prevented from repairing them nor the sacredness of their covenants.

No one of the nation (Muslims) is to disobey the covenant till the Last Day."

Achieving a Middle East Breakthrough

by Jerome Segal, reprinted with the author's permission, 25 October 2006. [Link](#)

In a recent interview in the Washington Post, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made this remarkable comment about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "Let the Palestinian people decide their fate in a free and fair referendum, and the result, whatever it is, should be accepted."

This Iranian suggestion of a Palestinian referendum dovetails with the position of Hamas, that the PLO, headed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, should negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinian people, but that any negotiated treaty must be subject to ratification by a referendum of all Palestinians including those in the Diaspora.

This emphasis on the use of a Palestinian referendum as the key to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not be dismissed as some public relations ploy. It speaks to several important Palestinian realities. One is that the PLO, to which Hamas does not belong, is not fully representative of the Palestinian people. A second is the belief that fundamental compromises on the Palestinian "right of return" will require direct expression by the people themselves.

There is also a political reality. Whatever his internal machinations, Ahmadinejad knows that the steam would go out of his ability to use the Palestinian cause for his own ends, were the Palestinian people to endorse a peace agreement. And similarly, the Hamas leadership knows that its own political legitimacy would require that it accept any peace treaty ratified by a referendum.

In both cases, this political reality has been turned to advantage. Without making any compromises in advance on issues of substance, Iran and Hamas have been able to point toward a process that opens the door to negotiations and could lead to resolving the conflict.

Thus, both Ahmadinejad and Ismail Haniye have been able to take stances of moderation without appearing to shift on issues of principle. The challenge for the rest of us is to find a way to use this opportunity in the cause of genuine peace.

The most straight-forward approach is to give PLO Chairman

Mahmoud Abbas what he has been asking for, a renewal of the Israeli-PLO final status talks that were last held in January of 2001, and broken off when Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister. This approach would sharply segregate peace negotiations from the issue of aid to the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. The aid issue would remain unchanged, and dependent on whether the government of the Palestinian Authority accepts the principles of nonviolence, acceptance of previous agreements and recognition of Israel's right to exist, laid down by the Quartet. Israel would not be negotiating with the Palestinian Authority government, but with the PLO, as did Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak, when Arafat was head of the PLO.

Polls of both Israelis and Palestinians suggest that an agreement acceptable to both peoples can be found. Yet were Israeli-PLO final status talks to resume, it is unclear whether either leadership would make the hard compromises needed to reach an agreement. Knowing this, the Bush administration has, understandably, been reluctant to repeat President Clinton's experience at Camp David in the summer of 2000.

An alternative approach, one that utilizes the referendum idea offers a way forward. Rather than traditional bilateral negotiations, the process would open with the Quartet (the US, EU, UN and Russia) putting on the table a fully drafted end-of-conflict peace treaty based on the Clinton parameters.

These parameters were accepted by Israel at the time, and are now also accepted by the PLO. Starting with the draft peace agreement, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators would be given six months to negotiate any improvements. Then, either in its original or improved form, Israel and the PLO would have to approve or reject the agreement.

Each party would utilize its own procedures. On the Israeli side this would mean a Cabinet decision on whether to bring the treaty to a vote in the Knesset. On the Palestinian side, if the PLO accepts the treaty document it would be submitted for ratification by a referendum of the Palestinian people. This approach would provide the Palestinian people with a moment of truth, an opportunity, in Ahmadinejad's words, "to decide their fate." Prior to negotiations, the Palestinians would need to enact specific procedures for calling and conducting a referendum. In addition there would have to be clarity that a treaty approved in a referendum is the law of the land, binding on all successor governments. Such steps are quite doable and would not take long to enact. The key is to focus on bringing a balanced end-of-conflict agreement to a decisive vote of the Palestinian people. Success here would open the door for full normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world, and possibly Iran. It is simply too important not to be tested.

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Just what is this 'absorption capacity' of the European Union?

by Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Gergana Noutcheva, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 113, 6 October 2006. [Link](#)

[Extract]

Conclusions

The tendency in some political discourse now is to say that, because the Constitution that was meant to prepare for enlargement failed to be ratified, this shows that the enlargement process has now hit a roadblock called 'absorptive capacity', with the European polity suffering from a malady called 'enlargement fatigue', and therefore it would be best to call a stop and define the EU's 'final frontiers'.

An alternative narrative is that the Constitution proposed some useful but marginal systemic changes. However its ratification was badly mismanaged by some political leaders, first by overselling it as a Jeffersonian Constitution to last for 50 years, secondly through compounding this by the choice to put it unnecessarily to referendum in France for reasons of domestic political tactics; hardly surprisingly the operation back-fired. Yet in the meantime the EU has not hit gridlock, and its current major political issues such as re-invigorating economic growth in the eurozone in the face of globalisation, immigration from the South and global terrorism have nothing to do with enlargement.

The case for a pause after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements is undeniable. EU27 has to settle down. The institutional imbroglio after the ratification failures of the Constitution has to be sorted out. It is also desirable that the new member states further catch-up economically before any further major enlargement. However the plausible time horizon for any next major enlargement is many years ahead, maybe 2015, with various transitional arrangements pushing the real date in important respects beyond 2020 (e.g. for the labour market). While political leaders have to take into account public opinion, there have been huge swings in views on the EU (up and down) over the last two decades, and it is hardly possible to try to forecast public opinion on the enlargement question for the years 2015 and beyond, which is the relevant time horizon.

The vague term 'absorptive capacity' is better de-constructed into more precise and objective components, with each to be discussed in relation to the hypothesis of a continuing enlargement process.

- The capacity of the EU's internal market and eurozone to absorb new member states is positive. The tendency in some public debate to confuse the positive economic effects of enlargement with the much more problematic challenges of globalisation need to be corrected by effective communication.
- The labour market has seen some bubbles of migratory flows to those EU states that opened their labour markets from the new member states without delay. However this is already translating into labour shortages in the countries of emigration,

which will lead to positive self-correcting adjustments, including rising wage levels in the new member states. By the time the EU's labour market might become completely open to a major further enlargement (i.e. beyond 2020), the EU will be confronted with very serious demographic problems of labour shortages and social security deficits, for which some immigration could be helpful, with Turkey as the only plausible source among potential accession candidates.

- The EU's budget is allocating about 1/3% of GDP to redistributive policies in favour of the poorest regions (especially those with GDP per capita under 75% of the EU average). Since the new member states are growing fast and therefore catching up at an appreciable rate, there is no reason to be alarmed at the prospect of a gradual continuation of the enlargement process on account of the budget. Of the recently acceding countries, several are already graduating out of the poor category, as Greece, Portugal and Spain have done in the last twenty years.

- The failure of the Constitution may have held back some useful institutional improvements, but in its absence the EU's decision-making processes have not run into a state of gridlock. Partial improvements under the Nice Protocol ease the problem of enlargement for the Commission and Parliament, and in the Council there are some signs of adaptation to the new situation with many more member states. Various improvements (e.g. for the Foreign Minister) now have widespread support, and efforts should be directed to finding astute solutions to a number of the outstanding institutional issues in due course, well before any major next enlargement.

- Society's capacity for absorbing immigration is today under tension in a climate of fear of terrorism, Islamophobia and uncertainty over Europe's models of multi-culturalism. Particularly with regard to the new Turkish minorities, public opinion appears at present to overdo the Islamic identification, since these communities are largely secularised, and sources neither of Islamic radicalisation nor terrorism, while Turkey at home is a strong democracy. In due course, European public opinion should become better informed about these objective facts, while the pursuit of new positive models for European multi-culturalism has to go on.

- The EU's capacity for assuring its strategic security is also at stake in any discussion of 'final frontiers'. For the Balkans reneging on the Thessaloniki commitments would mean renewed threats of inter-ethnic conflict. Deep integration of EU and Turkey's foreign and security policies with Turkey is of exceptional importance, given the evident hazards in Turkey's neighbourhood. For Ukraine denial of its European aspirations would undermine the prospects for democracy, already shown to be fragile with the failure of the Orange revolution, and encourage hegemonic tendencies in Russia. Above all, these various component parts of absorption capacity are not static, and can change over the long time horizon that is relevant. Changes in public opinion may be expected to follow as new realities become evident. The dynamics of enhancing capacities for change deserve priority attention, rather than fixation on static notions of absorptive capacity. Moreover in some key respects the EU's absorptive capacity for further enlargement is going to be what its leaders choose it

to be, especially as regards institutional factors. For EU leaders to ask the Commission to report on future absorption capacity becomes a circular argument, since it is for EU leaders to decide notably on institutional changes to enhance this absorption capacity.

The 'final frontiers' proposition (presumably to the exclusion of both Turkey and Ukraine at the least) is a thoroughly bad idea, since there are well-established outer limits in any case to the map of Europe (e.g. Council of Europe membership). It would be a strategic blunder for the EU now to invent a new irreversible dividing line within this map between 'real Europe' and an imagined 'other' (uncivilised?) Europe beyond. Such a move would undermine years of patient attempts to build up a unique European doctrine, reputation and practical capacity for the projection of enlightened soft power. It would damage the fundamental long-term objectives of extending Europe's democratic space and of working out a new multicultural synthesis, with viable models of multiculturalism to be sought in society within and across European frontiers.

The term 'absorptive capacity' should not be used in official texts without better specification, and de-construction into objective elements. Otherwise it gives the impression of some pseudo-scientific and static reality, and plays into the hands of populist political rhetoric.

EU Foreign Ministers Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans

Luxembourg, 16-17 October 2006. [Link](#)

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

Serbia/Kosovo

6. The Council urged the parties to engage constructively with the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari to bridge the gaps between their respective positions and to refrain from unilateral or provocative action. Recalling the statement issued at the Contact Group Ministerial Meeting on 20 September, the Council noted that striving for a negotiated settlement should not obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally delay or block the status process from advancing. In this context, the Council reiterated its full support for SE Ahtisaari and his efforts in conducting the political process to determine Kosovo's future status. It welcomed his intention to prepare a comprehensive settlement proposal as a basis for moving forward.


7. The Council took note of the report by the SRSG presented to the UN Security Council on 13 September. It noted the positive progress made in implementing the Kosovo Standards while recalling the crucial importance of and the need for further effective implementation of the standards. The Council urged Belgrade to encourage Serbs in Kosovo to participate in Kosovo's institutions, in which they can most effectively advocate their own interests.

8. The Council also welcomed the important preparatory work underway for a possible ESDP mission in the broader field of the rule of law and for the EU component of the future International Civilian Mission in Kosovo. The Council agreed


to extend the EU planning team regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) by three months until 31 March 2007.

The European Union and its Neighbours - Special Eurobarometer 259


European Commission, October 2006. [Link](#)



Source: Special Eurobarometer 259 "The European Union and its Neighbours", Summary version, p 6.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 259 "The European Union and its Neighbours", Summary version, p 7.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 259 "The European Union and its Neighbours", Summary version, p 8.

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