The very existence of Islam is based on the Qur’an which is seen by Muslims as the work of God, communicated to Mohammed by the Angel Gabriel, and preserved in heaven. All Islamic practices and customs can according to tradition be traced back to the Qur’an itself and the time of revelation. Sunna and Hadith, records of the acts of the Prophet and the Sharia or Islamic law are products of this time and closely linked to one another and the Qur’an.

Mohammed was born in 571 into the important Quraish tribe of Mekka and worked as a trader who came in contact with other cultures of the Middle East such as Syrian Christians and Jewish communities. In 595 he married his first wife Khadija

The first revelation of a part of the Qur’an occurred in 610 c.e. in a cave at Mount Hira. The Angel Gabriel communicated the first Sura and Mohammed accepted his role as prophet and began preaching in the town of Medina.

First he limited his teachings to close family members and relatives and he began to succeed in converting many of these to the new religion. However, in 613 he began preaching to the population of Mekka and thereby challenged the older power structures that were intertwined with the older Pagan beliefs.

Difficulties began to occur and in 615 a party of Muslim left for Abyssinia because of the state of constant persecution. In 617 even his own tribe, the Quraish began to rally against Mohammed and in 622 the community flees to Yatrib, later Medina. Here, the message is more readily accepted and more and more people convert. The balance of power in Medina begins to shift towards Mohammed and in 624 the Muslims managed to repel an attack on their new stronghold by the Meccans at the Battle of Badr. After this victory the city was largely controlled by his followers and Jewish tribes were expelled from it after refusing to convert.

The pilgrimage to Mecca - a "must" in the life of a Moslem.

In 628 followed the truce of Hudaibiya between Mecca and Medina, which included provisions for Muslims that allowed them to perform the pilgrimage to the Kabba in Mecca. Pilgrimages to Mecca then started in 629 and by 630 the Muslim community had gained control over the city of Mecca.

By the time of the death of Mohammed in 632 a large part of the Arabian peninsula was under the control of the rapidly expanding Muslim community. After the election of Abu Bakr as new Caliph expeditions to Syria and later the conquest of the greater Middle East followed.

Sunni and Shia

The existence of these two main branches of Islam, which could be seen as an equivalent to the split in Christianity between Catholics and Protestants, goes back to the first crisis among the followers of Islam. The Prophet Mohammed left no obvious successor and after his sudden and unexpected death in 632 c.e. his followers used agreement to choose the new leader. Abu Bakr was elected first Caliph after the death of Mohammed; followed by Umar. However, no consensus could be found after the death of the second successor and the new Caliph Osman was never accepted by all followers of Islam.

The reasons for this crisis and the following civil war are not entirely clear but one explanation is an abuse of power by members of his tribe, another attempt to codify the text of the Qur’an in 653.

The development of the ensuing civil war is far clearer than the trigger for it. In 655 uprisings occurred in Kufa, Iraq, and 656 in Egypt. In the end an army of 500 men occupied Medina and the Caliph Osman was killed. Civil war followed and some chose Ali as a successor in 656 because his was wife was related to the Prophet Mohammed. As a result of the dispute over his leadership new fighting broke out and a second Caliph, Muawiya, was proclaimed. Intense fighting between Ali’s party, the Shia, and the party of Muawiya followed and in 661 Ali was killed. Ever since he his death he has been revered by Shia Islam.

After his death his party was backed by Iraqi patriots and his opposition was supported mainly in the area of modern-day Syria. The theological differences largely emerged later. Most importantly, a system of lineage to the Prophet developed which has no basis in the Arab tradition and may be inspired by older Persian traditions. Shia Islam also incorporated other older elements such as the transmission of a divine element from Adam to Mohammed and then to Ali.

This then led to the rejection of the Sunni consensus on the schools of law. In Shia Islam the clergy decides on religious matters by consensus until the anticipated return of the Imam Ali. This dogma is the reasoning behind the constitutional role the Ayatollahs were given after the revolution in Iran and also the explanation for the influence the Shia leaders exert in parts of Iraq.

The area of today’s Iraq is in many ways significant for Shia Islam since holy places like Kufa and Nadschaf feature prominently in its history. Uprisings and repression form a significant part of this history and the collective memory of the Shia population. This began with the suppression of the uprising in 740 by followers of Zaid and continued until the days of Saddam Hussein who based his government largely on Sunnis despite the fact that the majority of Iraqis see themselves as Shiites.

Shiite Muslims form a part of the population in Lebanon, Pakistan, India, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan and about 54% of the Iraqi population. The total number is estimated at around 90 million. All these groups have a long history as persecuted minorities. The only exception to this is Iran- the only place where Shiite Muslims form a majority of the population and the government.

Schools of law

The different schools of law developed with the interpretation of the Sharia and its application in daily life after the death of the prophet. They are based on the idea that a consensus of the faithful is infallible which can be found in the Qur’an. However, Sunni clerics decided that all questions were answered in the 11^th century and only the Shia still relies on the principle of consensus.

In Sunni Islam four schools of law developed and the Shia view can be defined as a fifth school. Sunni Muslims can choose freely between these four schools but may not change from one to another or mix doctrines.

The blue mosque in Istanbul - Turkey is a secular, democratic state.

The school of the Hanafites relies mainly on the personal views of the clergy in the decision-making process. Roughly a third of all Muslims follows this school. They form a majority in Turkey, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Asia.

The Malakite school spread mainly in North- and Central-Africa and uses the greater good for society in the decision-making process.

Safiites technically rely on a consensus among all believers. However, since this is largely impractical the clergy started to form the actual backbone of this school. The school is commonly accepted in Jordan, Lebanon, South-Arabia and parts of Asia.

Hanbalites form the most conservative school of law. Only traditions that be linked directly to the Prophet and his companions are acceptable to the followers of this school. It is favoured by extremists, relatively common on the Arabian Peninsula and has some followers in Egypt and Syria.

Radicalisation of Islamic Society in recent years

The Muslim community today is by no means a unified and homogenous body. Many doctrines that were mentioned earlier are questioned by groups in virtually all countries and there is not always a link between religious doctrine, traditions and the daily life of the majority. Not everyone follows all religious obligations, as one would expect, and fanaticism is widely rejected. However, there has been a marked increase in the observance of religious duties and a surge in Islamic politics since the mid-1970s.

Governments, with the exceptions of the regimes in Saudi-Arabia, the Sudan and smaller states, generally attempt to follow a moderate approach to government. The western value systems are of some significance despite the dubious legitimacy of Middle Eastern governments and many are more liberal than the majority of the population would wish ( see Power structures in Islamic Societies).

However, even autocratic governments follow the general trend towards a stronger Islamic influence. In 1925 a member of the Al-Azhar University, the highest authority in Sunni Islam, called Ali Abd Ar-Raziq published a document entitled “Islam and the principles of government “ that called for a complete separation between Islam and Government. At the time he was merely dismissed. Similarly, the Syrian Army magazine published an article calling Islam a “mummy” and the author got away with a prison sentence despite minor rioting. Today the reaction of the public and the judicial consequences would be far more significant and no official publication would carry similar articles.

An explanation for this is the brief period from roughly the 1950s to the 1970s when rulers in Middle Eastern countries flirted with essentially western ideologies like nationalism and socialism. Nassers revolution in Egypt as well as the Ba’athist regimes in Syria and Iraq were essentially secular movements that were based on a mixture of pan-Arab nationalism and an interpretation of socialism. This had an impact on the views of the population. Hopes were rising high and modernisation was widely welcomed at the time. Results of this drive towards modernity were the increase in the consumption of alcohol and the public burning of Qur’ans in Iraq after the revolution. Saddam Hussein supported these views until the defeat in the second Gulf war and the beginning of the subsequent sanctions. Then even the hard-drinking Ba’athist began to pray in public, used significantly more religious references in public speeches and finally “God is Great” appeared on the Iraqi flag.

He followed a trend that had begun in the late 1960s and accelerated in the mid 1970s. Since then the interpretation of Islam has become progressively stricter in all Middle Eastern countries and the influence of extremists has been growing at a similar rate. Alcohol has disappeared from public view even though it is still not illegal in many countries and more importantly women’s rights are diminishing. In Egypt posters appeared late last year telling women that the head-scarf is not a sufficient cover and only the full veil of the Nikab can secure a place in heaven.

In the Iraq of Saddam Hussein pre 1991 and Jordan this process was slowed down by the higher standards of living and education whereas it was accelerated by poverty in Egypt and the Sudan. Many educated Iraqis studied in the west with government funding and the close political links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the west facilitated the exchange of ideas on many different levels. Foreigners taught at Iraqi universities, western notion of freedom and secularism filtered down to all layers of society and were tolerated by the regime as long as they did not result in opposition to the dictatorship. Most Iraqis were not suppressed in the traditional sense but tied to the regime by means of high standards of living and education.

This does not justify the atrocities committed by the regime but puts the U.S. actions from 1991 onwards into a different light. The radical religious beliefs faced by U.S. troops on a daily basis today go back to the period between the second Gulf war of 1991 and the beginning of the current invasion. The end of the 1991 war was not the end of the bombardments. The last wave started in 1998 and continued until the beginning of the current occupation. In 1998 325 Tomahawk-rockets and 90 Cruise-missiles were fired, in 2000 155 tonnes of explosives were dropped and 2001 107 tonnes. The regime of Saddam Hussein was not destabilised but the impact on living conditions was clear.

The sanctions were similarly successful. Poverty increased dramatically and healthcare could no longer be provided but the Ba’athist grip on power was not weakened. According to UNESCO figures 500.000 children were killed by the sanctions- the then U.S. Secretary of State Albright commented on CNN that it was “a price worth paying”. All this radicalised the population and gave validity to Marx observation that “religion is opium for the masses”. The situation U.S. troops face today were not created by the occupation as such but by the preceding 10 years of cold war.

In other countries the radicalisation that began in the mid-1970s can be explained by other factors such as the defeats the Arab nations suffered in the wars against Israel and particularly in the 1967 war, the failure of economic reforms and socialist experiments and the wars against colonial powers. Especially the war of independence in Algeria and the struggle in the 1980s in Afghanistan had a significant impact on the whole region. Furthermore, all economic concepts that were not based on oil or foreign aid failed.

La Mezquita in Cordoba - one of the most beautiful Moorish-Islamic mosques.

The result was a feeling that a new, specific way towards prosperity had to be found that then manifested itself in new religious fervour and latent support for all anti-western tendencies; during the Gulf-war the Arab street as well as many intellectuals of the Arab world supported Saddam Hussein simply because he opposed the west and not because of any sympathies for his style of government or greater plans.

At the governmental level the situation is quite different. Evocations of sympathy are common and during Arab league meetings the form of address remains “brother” but there is no real, practical unity. Even during the wars against Israel the Arab units co-ordinated badly and many strategic plans included attacks on neighbouring states after the destruction of Israel.

Despite these difficulties there is a vague pan-Arab feeling among the populations of Arab countries and governments have to take it into account; the demonstrations against the U.S. occupation of Iraq are a recent example.

Jihad

These token gestures by governments are partially made to appease the modern Jihad-movement which is rooted in and to some extend strengthened the notion of Pan-Islamic unity.

Literally the word jihad can simply be translated as struggle or strive, however, the Qur’an defines it as “..fight against them (the infidels) until no one attempts to tempt believers away from Islam and until only Allah is worshipped..” Sura 8/39. This can, like any religious dogma, be stretched and interpreted widely. Radicals would define it as a permanent state of war that began with the advent of Islam, has continued since and will continue until the whole world has converted to Islam; an idea that mirrors Huntington’s “bloody borders” of Islam rather closely. More commonly Jihad is defined as a strive towards personal betterment or a call to the defence of Muslim lands in case of attack rather than as the offensive war propagated by Abdullah Azzam and other prominent radicals who inspired the Al-Quaida movement.

There is also some theoretical protection for “people of the book”, Qur’anic phrase describing Muslims, Christians and Jews. The Qur’an prohibits Muslims from carrying out attacks against Christians and Jews on the basis of differences in belief, however, the concept of Jihad is currently used by radicals to justify all forms of terrorism regardless of the nature of the target.

Daily life in Islamic states

All these difficulties and discrepancies express themselves on a daily basis. The religious and political views are extremely diverse and aggravated by the vast gap between the very richest layers of society and the extreme poverty that can be found in most Middle Eastern countries.

Even in moderate countries like Egypt whose governments are staunch supporters of the west one can find conditions one would expect in the Afghanistan of the Taliban only hours away from the tourist attractions, nightclub and bars of the main cities. Customs, beliefs and social norms have not changed for centuries and re no longer compatible with the views of the middle and upper classes in the cities despite their newfound love for Islam.

The maintenance of public order relies on a permanent, large scale deployment of police and troops in all parts of the country and the isolation of large parts of the country. Western tourists in Egypt travel through middle Egypt in convoys which are frequently flanked by armoured vehicles and the inhabitants of this “hotbed” of extremism are under constant surveillance from secret police units. Torture and large scale arrest combined with minor concessions have crushed terrorism after the 1997 attacks on tourists but the pressure cooker metaphor seems appropriate despite the fact that Egypt is overall one of the more stable dictatorships.

Power structure in Islamic societies

The basic structures of Islamic societies reflect these difficulties and have in many respects not changed since the time of Mohammed. Max Weber saw the societies of the Middle East as results of a patriarchal construct and used this theory to explain the selection processes for leaders in the Arab world. He assumed that the organisational structure of Bedouin times was still to some extend intact. The theory can be extended to the leaders of most countries in the region.

Moslem prayers in a Mosque.

He assumed that Bedouin tribes had to have a leader whose command over his tribe was unquestioned; within his family he had to have absolute authority. This was achieved by eliminating women from the decision making processes, only allowing them to influence decisions indirectly through relatives, and by dividing favours between the sons. These favours were given in exchange for loyalty and furthermore divisions were created by leaving areas authorities undefined. This then resulted in permanent competition that would in the end leave the sons weak and the position of the tribal leader unchallenged.

According to Weber this pattern then extended from the family to the whole society. Alliances between tribes were formed on a similar basis and finally countries were formed by tribal alliances or tribal alliances emerged in countries created by the previous colonial rulers. In all cases Weber assumed that the leader at the top used and strengthened his own position by distributing favours and creating competition among all potential rivals. According to this theory the state is nothing but a larger version of a Bedouin-family.

Saddam Hussein supported this analysis openly when he told journalists openly that “The Godfather” was not only his favourite film but also an inspiration for his leadership. This shows that even the secular, Ba’athist former dictator acted in accordance with the theory put forward by Weber. His relationship with his sons and his extended family, who all occupied key government positions, can be seen as further evidence. Other regional leaders are less open about their inspirations but nevertheless created similar structures.

The rulers of the regions seek to portray themselves as unchallengeable, absolute rulers. The picture of the King Abdullah of Jordan can be found on most streetcorners, the presidents of Egypt and Syria maintain a similar pictorial presence and the statues of Saddam Hussein that were recently toppled in front of the world media were virtually omnipresent throughout the country. Other similarities are the high military ranks occupied by all leaders in the Middle East, whether fundamentally civilian or not, the portrayal as some form of spiritual leaders, well-publicised praying in public, and the fact that the rulers of virtually all countries are unchallengeable. In many ways this emulates the way the Prophet of Islam is portrayed- Mohammed was a spiritual, military and moral leader and is clearly a role model for the majority of heads of state in the Middle East.

As a result all governments in the region are dictatorships; only Turkey and Israel show significant variations from this pattern. In all other countries the bureaucracies are enormous and areas of authority are left undefined between different government departments and the authority of the dictator is unlimited- there is no division between the judicative, the executive and legislative branches of government and importantly no division between state and religion. Different groups undermine each other and thereby secure the position of the dictator who in turn encourages this competition and consciously creates an environment that weakens all potential rivals. Again, Weber’s theory seems valid.

King Fahd of Saudi-Arabia, an important ally of the west in the Middle East, declared in this context that:

“ The democratic system that is dominant in the world is not suitable for the peoples of our region….the system of free elections is not suitable for our country”

This view is widespread. The religious parties would easily win free elections in all Middle Eastern countries and abolish democracy with the consent of the majority of the inhabitants within days. The dictatorships in some Middle Eastern countries therefore secure a form of western democracy; meaning that they ensure some form of participation in the political process and that they limit the influence of Islam on the legal system. This paradox whereby dictatorship secures freedoms that would otherwise be lost is particularly clear in Egypt. The relatively large and well-educated middle class fears the masses and therefore democracy greatly and therefore supports the dictatorship of Mubarak fervently despite the obvious disadvantages and shortcomings.

This can also be said about present –day Syria and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Both systems are or were essentially secular structures. Despite the influence of local culture both systems share a common root with western dictatorships and guarantee certain rights for all citizens as long as they do not oppose the regime. The legal systems function along the lines of western ideas and women’s rights are guaranteed to a large extend. The post-Gulf war III U.S. experiment in Iraq is in many ways interesting but may not guarantee the freedoms the majority of Iraqis enjoyed under Saddam Hussein since the clergy as well as the majority of the inhabitants oppose the western notions of democracy and human rights.

The experiment is also morally dubious since the right of self determination of a people is limited to the right to democracy. It does not seem to include the right to abolish democracy by the means of democratic process because democracy is the path the U.S. chose to impose on the world.