"Enhancing the rolling consensus, from the dynamic new Obama administration to the European countries and the Gulf States, to support Pakistan with a focus on the tribal areas (FATA) and to separate the tiny radical minority of less than 1 percent from the great majority of 99 percent of peaceful people."

The independent World Security Network Foundation - aside from networking the young global elite in foreign affairs - aims to discuss the most pressing current issues in security policy openly and without taboos, and to promote fresh new ideas in global affairs outside the box of administrations and standard paths. WSN is actively "Networking a Safer World" using the tools of effective entrepreneurs and the know-how of its international network of experts including 16 former generals.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, bordering on Afghanistan, with their 3.5m inhabitants from several fiercely independent Pashtun tribes are one main focus of WSN, and are important for three strategic goals:

• Homeland Security: Containment of the recruitment and training of new terrorists and activities of Al Qaeda elements which threaten Europe, the United States, the Gulf Countries and other states. Osama bin Laden is in hiding here with other Al Qaeda leaders.
• Stabilization of Pakistan: Neutralization of the increasingly destabilizing effects of terrorism and radicalization for the democratic government of Pakistan.
• Stabilization of Afghanistan: Reducing the cross-border threat by the Taliban forces to the military missions of NATO and stability in Afghanistan, as the Taliban use this region for recruitment and resupplying.

The tribal areas are the most important hinterland of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Since 2008 WSN has organized two international workshops in Berlin and London with more than 160 experts to look for solutions for FATA in the context of Pakistan, Afghanistan and homeland security.

Looking for options and best solutions for FATA and Pakistan WSN uses its strong team in Pakistan including its two editors Samad Khan and Owais Ehsan as well as its six members in the WSN International Advisory Board General ret Ehsan ul Haq (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004-2007; Director ISI 2001-2004), LtGen ret Ali Aurakzai (Governor of the North West Frontier Province untill January 2008; former Corps Commander in Peshawar), BrigGen ret. Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi from Lahore, Habib Malik Orakzai (Chairman of the Tribal Youth Organization in FATA and Pakistan International Human Rights Organization (PIHRO) and member Afghan-Pak Joint Jirga) and the two businessmen and YPO members Amin Hashwani and Arif Ali Shah Bukhari from Karachi.

You may find our analyses and concrete proposals below.

We are very pleased that many of our proposals have been reflected in the new "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" presented by U.S. President Barack Obama on March 27, 2009.

To evaluate the situation in FATA and Afghanistan WSN President Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann met the legendary head of the Pakistani Secret Service (ISI) in the late 1980s, Gen. Lt. (Ret.) Hamid Gul, and according to some sources an old friend of Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. He told WSN: "The USA and its allies have the chance to negotiate an exit with dignity or they will later have to retreat in shame. For 5,000 years every occupation of the Afghan mountains has failed-why should NATO be successful this time?"

The World Security Network Foundation, together with the Royal College of Defense Studies, organized a second FATA Workshop after the first successful Berlin workshop in May 2008, now in London. More than one hundred experts from all over the world discussed how to improve the situation in this strategically important region in Pakistan.

Here you may find the main presentations of the Second FATA Workshop:

• Aims of the WSN-RCDS FATA Workshop by Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President and Founder, World Security Network Foundation
• Proposals for Pilot Projects in FATA by Ali Aurakzai, Former Governor of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Samad Khan, Pakistan Editor, World Security Network
• FATA Scholarship Fund by Ali Aurakzai, Former Governor of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Samad Khan, Pakistan Editor, World Security Network
• How to Control the Money Flow for FATA Projects by Riaz Khokhar, former Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
• NATO in Afghanistan and better Cooperation with Pakistan- by General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
• Militants have gained Ground in Pakistan-like in the Swat Valley- by Dr. Humayan Khan, former Foreign Secretary and High Commissioner of Pakistan in London
• The Strategic Triangle: FATA-Pakistan-Afghanistan- by Ambassador Francesc Vendrell, Senior Visiting Fellow at Princeton University and former EU Special Representative to Afghanistan
• Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas: how can the UK support development?- by Judith Kent, Head of Policy, South Asia Strategy and Operations, UK Department for International Development (DfID)
• The people of FATA need development- by Habib Malik Orakzai, Chairman of the Tribal Youth Organization in FATA and Pakistan International Human Rights Organization (PIHRO) and member Afghan-Pak Joint Jirga
• Next Steps in the FATA- by Sir Hilary Synnott, Consulting Senior Fellow for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, former Regional Coordinator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Southern Iraq and former British High Commissioner to Pakistan

More main presentations recorded by WSN TV may be found here:

• The New Strategic Triangle FATA-Pakistan-Afghanistan
  • Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Director-General, Political Directorates, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, former British High Commissioner in Pakistan
  • Sir Richard Dearlove, Master of the Pembroke College, Cambridge, and former Chief of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

• Action required- What are the next steps?
  • Sir Paul Lever, Chairman of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) and former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

Several participants provided papers for discussion:

• General (Retd) Rainer Schuwirth, former Chief of Staff SHAPE
• Owen Bennett Jones, journalist BBC online
• Commander M.W. Ewence, Royal Navy U.K.
• John Leech, European Coordinator West-West Agenda, UK
• Carsten Michels, Editor, World Security Network
• Victoria Schofield, Writer
• Abubakar Siddique, Presenter, Radio Free Europe

More information about the attitudes of the population towards governance, religion and society in FATA can be found at www.understandingfata.org

Further background information from the FATA Secretariat about development in FATA can be found here: FATA Development Briefing January 2009

German entrepreneur and geostrategist Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President and Founder of the World Security Network Foundation meets the tribesmen at the Khyber pass in the FATA: "Important is what the local population wants, needs and wishes for the future. This includes references to traditions and historical facts. A fresh, more constructive approach and double strategy of roll-back of the radicals and concrete developments is needed for FATA."

On February 19, 2009, more than 100 experts assembled on invitation of the independent World Security Network UK (WSN) at the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) in London to discuss fresh approaches for the important region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its relationship to the developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This 2^nd FATA Workshop of the WSN brought together specialists from Pakistan as well as from the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, France, Poland, NATO and the EU and made the complex situation as well as the options for solutions much clearer. Several new ideas and proposals were created.

Out of the numerous different perspectives in the day-long discussions - which were moderated by BrigGen (retd) Dieter Farwick (WSN) and by MajGen Sir Sebastian Roberts and the commandant Vice Admiral Charles Style from the RCDS - emerged a 'rolling consensus' which includes the following proposals:

Psycho-political local bottom-up-approach for region needed

1. All planning of policies and strategies towards FATA, Pakistan and Afghanfistan should be made bottom-up, and not top-down as was done in the past. Important is not what Washington, London or Berlin think is needed, but what the local populations want, need and wish for the future. This includes references to traditions and historical facts. The West must search for this or will fail like the Soviets did between 1979 and 1989. The governments in the West as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan have failed with their strategies as the militant elements have gained ground in the last years. A military victory objectively cannot be achieved, even with more troops as announced by U.S. President Obama. A fresh, more constructive approach and double strategy is needed.

2. The policy toward FATA and the integration of Pakistan into the planning of NATO should come out of Pakistan and must have a Pakistani face. The war against the radicals as well as operations in Afghanistan are mainly perceived as the fight of the West and not as a struggle for Pakistan's national interests.

3. Pakistan must become a respected real and long-time partner and not treated in a colonial-style manner with a stick-and-carrot approach. It is an unacceptable idea to impose the will of the West upon the people in this region.

4. Europe must be more active and not leave it to America to develop a fresh approach in its own homeland security interests.

5. A new strategy for this region should include the wisdom of unique Pentagon strategist Fritz Kraemer, who on one side argued that raw power is necessary to check wild fanatics and that provocative weakness has to be avoided, yet on the other side demanded solutions that address the soul of the people, promote a process of regeneration, look for imaginativeness and inner visions, and shape - not only adopt - political realities with an inner musicality for the psycho-political elements. All this was missed for seven years and is needed now to turn around the situation (see www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/fritzkraemer).

6. For a new comprehensive strategy und its effective implementation for FATA, Pakistan and Afghanistan we need creativity as well as Churchillian wisdom and a 'Yes, we can' approach. Albert Einstein once said: "Imagination is more important than knowledge" and "We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them".

7. One of the fundamental problems in managing foreign affairs from the Western point of view and internal affairs from of the Pakistani and Afghani perspective is that most politicians think their words are deeds. Indeed, words usually do not matter at all but only actions on the ground combined with sufficient funding and strict scheduling and controlling. The implementation is key. The "mess in Afghanistan" (Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan) as well as in FATA and Pakistan has its roots in this misperception and the implementation gap.

More than 100 experts assembled on invitation of the World Security Network UK (WSN) at the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) in London to discuss fresh approaches for the important FATA region and its relationship to the developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. "The policy toward FATA and the integration of Pakistan into the planning of NATO should come out of Pakistan and must have a Pakistani face. The war against the radicals as well as operations in Afghanistan are mainly perceived as the fight of the West and not as a struggle for Pakistan's national interests."

Fresh approaches and a new double strategy for FATA

1. The tribal areas FATA on the border to Afghanistan - with their more than 3 million inhabitants in over 6,000 villages - have a unique and toxic mix of Al Qaeda including Osama bin Laden, who is still hiding there with his core group hosted by tribes over seven years after 9/11; the Taliban from Afghanistan, who regroup here and plan cross-border attacks; and radicals from Pakistan and Europe who come for training. This critical area must therefore be the focus of attention now after too many years lost without a clear strategy.

2. Focus on convincing the tribes to demand that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda leave, giving them incentives and assurances of the West and Pakistan to leave them alone - using fresh security interests of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to neutralize this global phantom of terror now. 'Carving out Al Qaeda' is the focus.

3. Moving to immediate actions in FATA after many years lost, we should start concrete initial civilian projects for the FATA population now, perhaps first - for security reasons - on the border to FATA. Ideal pilots should: be achievable under adverse conditions in FATA; require moderate funding; take effect for the suffering people rapidly; use resources efficiently; be easy to implement; employ reliable people and institutions; allow effective control and monitoring of funds.

4. The focus should be on ice-breaker projects at the border to FATA to first support the population, keeping a very low profile for foreign aid and NGOs and working primarily through Pakistani organizations.

5. Priority needs to be given to projects with a focus on supporting the future of FATA, the young generation under 18 years - as they will one day either join the Taliban or not, depending in part on whether they are educated and employed. Start now at the border to FATA in the NWFP with projects. Do not only promise but deliver. Use only Pakistani subcontractors who are experienced and reliable and not suspect for the tribes.

6. Former Governor of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and FATA Administrator Lt Gen ret. Ali Aurakzai presented a list of first priority projects (see details in "Proposals for Pilot Projects in FATA"):

   • FATA Scholarship Fund for boys and girls who get higher education in the safer NWFP. 5,000 students apply each year for only 100 Scholarships in Peshawar. 100 more Scholarships cost only €1m for six years of education (see "FATA Scholarship Fund").

   • FATA Education, Health and Skill Centres in five locations at the border to FATA where 5,000 children can learn and 6,000 can be educated in courses in vocal training and craftsmen, with basic medical centres.

   • FATA Welfare organization as a catalyst for work for FATA, independent from government restraints, and as a first national Pakistani NGO for this work which can crystallize FATA projects and analysis.

   • A Tribal Broadcasting Network for positive information for the tribesmen who are now unduly influenced by mobile Taliban radio stations.

7. "Priority needs to be given to projects with a focus on supporting the future of FATA, the young generation under 18 years - as they will one day either join the Taliban or not, depending in part on whether they are educated and employed. The priority project should be the FATA Scholarship Fund for boys and girls who get higher education in the safer NWFP. 5,000 students apply each year for only 100 Scholarships in Peshawar. 100 more Scholarships cost only €1m for six years of education (see "FATA Scholarship Fund")."

   One of the major problems is to make sure that the money reaches the people and does not disappear. Former Foreign Secretary and Pakistani Ambassador Riaz Khokhar proposed a new system on how to control the flow of money into FATA. He promotes greater transparency and accountability so that donors ensure that the funds reach the people, with independent inspectors and audits on the ground (see "How to Control the Money Flow for FATA Projects") ,

8. Europe with Poland, the UK and Germany and the Gulf States including Saudi Arabia should not wait for the new administration in Washington and lose more time, but should now forcefully start funding first FATA projects to develop from political promises to real action. Barack Obama will demand more support in this region from his allies soon. London, Berlin and Warsaw must lead in Europe with the first ice-breaker projects according to the Proposals for Pilot Projects in FATA. Only words and a series of one conference after another without action on the ground are no longer enough and contradict the national interest of the European countries and the Gulf States. Precise plans and actions are needed - not more meetings.

9. The Frontier Corps (FC) must be strengthened immediately as the radicals are better equipped. More than 50 experts from the U.S. are now training units in anti-insurgency warfare for several months. Until now the FC was a light military policy united with little firepower and mobility - enough to keep peace among the tribes but not to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

10. The regular Pakistani army involved in operation in the tribal areas also lacks know-how and capacities in insurgency warfare. It is still a classical force designed for traditional warfare and shows extreme weakness in selected targeting and operations as shown in Swat, where 15,000 troops were not able to roll-back 3,000 radicals.

11. The tribes should be better armed now to roll back and contain the radicals on their territory, who also killed many of their elders and maliks and threatened the centuries-old traditional order in FATA.

12. The introduction of the Sharia in the FATA region Swat was seen as the wrong signal at the wrong time. Only after the radicals are defeated and not before should the population get its traditional legal system back, if they choose, without pressure - which was and will be unique in FATA. Most people support the re-introduction of the Sharia as they are totally frustrated with the existing legal system, which takes many years to solve legal disputes. Some proposed a 'roll-back' of the radicals in Swat and to focus of more special forces there to defeat the radicals in this jewel of the tribal areas and show strength and not weakness by the Pakistani military.

13. FATA is not at all a lost area or a sanctuary for terrorists as is often reported in the media. 99 percent of the population are not radicals, but only 1 out of 100 have joined the Taliban (see www.understandingfata.org for polls and views of the population). This region was not cleverly managed after 9/11 when the U.S. and NATO came to Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Hundred of radicals fled from there to FATA. More than 200 were captured or killed by the Pakistani army in 2001/2002. The population even welcomed the Pakistani army and supported it in these first years. After this the option was lost starting in 2003. Too little money was invested and only military actions by the U.S. and the Pakistani army pushed the population against them step by step. This is why trust-building measures with the population are urgently needed.

14. "Pakistan is, together with Afghanistan, itself, the main victim of the 30-year-long war in Afghanistan. More than two million Afghani refugees have been living in Pakistan for more than 20 years. The poisoned world of drugs is getting into the society as well as the ideology of violent Jihad. Pakistan has suffered and slipped over the years into its own state of emergency because of so many bomb attacks by radicals in Pakistan itself. The economic crisis adds to the desperation of the people."

    The population of FATA should decide in a referendum after the roll-back of the radicals whether they want to stay autonomous as they have for a long time, form their own province within Pakistan, or join the existing NWFP. Pakistan should integrate FATA but accept the tradition and desire for independence.

15. The U.S. and the European states should start funding now with $1bn the $ 2bn FATA Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) from 2006; so far only $100m had been funded by the U.S.

16. A fresh new FATA double strategy of power and reconciliation is needed, with concrete civilian projects to support the population and a roll-back of the radicals. The comprehensive strategy must include all parties involved in this region and along the border and set a priority on local needs and perceptions. With military means alone peace in FATA is not possible. The focus must be the implementation of the strategy, basic institution building, starting with small steps and visible concrete ice-breaker projects. The West must keep a low profile there and use local Pakistani organizations.

    FATA is not lost but a victim of no strategy or wrong strategic approaches and a lack of implementation of the West and Pakistan over the last 30 years.

    It can be turned around step by step into a peaceful area again, as it was before 1979.

Military Cooperation Afghanistan - Pakistan

1. Contrary to public perception, twice as many Pakistani soldiers are involved in the fight against the Taliban (120,000 in FATA) than U.S. and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan (55,000) and many more Pakistani soldiers have died (more than 1,800 in FATA) than soldiers of the ISAF and U.S. forces (1,006). Pakistan bears the main burden in this conflict and has lost more blood. Popular Western demands that Pakistan "should do more" are therefore unfair.

2. NATO General Karl-Heinz Lather, the Chief of Staff of SHAPE, told the workshop participants about several promising means of cooperation between the ISAF forces and the Pakistani army cross-border with a rolling consensus to adopt a regional approach. The cooperation between Afghanistan, ISAF and Pakistan on the 4-star level is working in committees for intelligence, border security and executive. A Joint Intelligence Centre was established in 2007 for sharing intelligence between Pakistan, Afghanistan and ISAF. There is no reason why there should not be a comprehensive political-military plan for Afghanistan. More activities could be done by Pakistan and the Allies to stabilize the region. General Lather mentioned progress with a new Pakistani liaison officer in the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and a ISAF liaison in Islamabad. The trilateral commission of ISAF, the Afghan National Security Forces and the Pakistani Security Forces must be supported and developed fincluding a broader border management plan with a new Coordination Centre. NATO countries support now the modernization of the Frontier Corps and Pakistani army with equipment, training and doctrine for counter-insurgency operations (see the speech by General Lather here).

3. The reduction of civilian casualties is key as such casualties produce more enemies than they may kill and drive the Pashtun tribes into the hands of the radicals.

   The use of Predator drones and Hellfire missiles against selected top radical leaders in FATA in close cooperation with the Pakistani forces has been very successful in the last six months, eliminating 11 high value radicals, yet only after many unsuccessful strikes with too many civilian casualties in the years before. A clear majority in Pakistan is against the use of foreign weapons on FATA soil and does not see this as support but intervention.

Pakistan

1. Pakistan is, together with Afghanistan, itself, the main victim of the 30-year-long war in Afghanistan. More than two million Afghani refugees have been living in Pakistan for more than 20 years. The poisoned world of drugs is getting into the society as well as the ideology of violent Jihad. Pakistan has suffered and slipped over the years into its own state of emergency because of so many bomb attacks by radicals in Pakistan itself. The economic crisis adds to the desperation of the people.

2. "Until now neither the population nor the military leadership nor elite in Pakistan have changed their attitude and focus towards the new threat of terrorism. Still like a rabbit against a snake, Pakistan is focussed on its former arch-enemy and still suspicious Eastern neighbour India. Afghanistan is seen as a glacis needed for strategic depth. A containment of the radicals in FATA must prevail before their activity spreads all over the country. This is in the national interest of Pakistan, not only the West."

   Until now neither the population nor the military leadership nor elite in Pakistan have changed their attitude and focus towards the new threat of terrorism. Still like a rabbit against a snake, Pakistan is focussed on its former arch-enemy and still suspicious Eastern neighbour India. Afghanistan is seen as a glacis needed for strategic depth. The army is equipped to fight heavy and not light wars. As such, there is still no priority to fight the real threat: the radicals. After FATA, the largest Pakistani province Balochistan with 7.5 million inhabitants and its capital Quetta could become the next area where the radicals gain influence and become dominant. This would threaten a core region of Pakistan. Therefore a containment of the radicals in FATA must prevail before their activity spreads all over the country. This is in the national interest of Pakistan, not only the West.

3. The Pakistani people also suffer from an extremely weak civilian government and party system and a prevalence of corruption involving too many for too long. The gap between the government and the population is widening and the chances for radicals are increasing. The army is still the glue which holds this large Muslim country with nuclear weapons together. A fresh political reform process within Pakistan seems unavoidable to stabilize the country. Some see the movement of lawyers as a catalyst and argue in favour of a national unity government with fresh reliable personalities and the impeachment of the old party system supported but not dominated by the army. Only few believe that current President Asif Ali Zardari will remain in office for long. The West should not base its policy on leaders who have no clear track record against corruption but become a sponsor of good governance and the governance of law in Pakistan and back the reformist personalities. The army as well must enhance the credibility of all political institutions and support credible leaders. It should learn from the historical mistakes of the influential armies in Germany and Japan in the 1930's who missed the window of opportunity to stop and contain the radicals atomizing their nations they should have protected.

4. Pakistan and the new faces in politics should be embraced by the U.S. and Europe now to help this important country to reform and survive. NATO should integrate its Pakistani counterparts into all Afghanistan-related meetings, i.e. inviting President Zardari to the next NATO and Afghanistan summits. Pakistan's views must be included in all discussions and decisions about Afghanistan.

5. Pakistan feels sandwiched between India and Afghanistan. Therefore India should reduce all its activities in Afghanistan to a minimum in order not to trigger more fears of encirclement from the West. It must also, in its own security interests, start a fresh reconciliation progress in Kashmir and treat the Muslim population there at its best. India needs a détente with Pakistan, as well, so as not to provoke the very large Indian Muslim population later. Until now the old thinking in India versus Pakistan prevails and the old guard of decade-long politicians and technocrats follow the old paths. The West must focus on Kashmir as well as on FATA and establish trilateral negotiations about this region including Pakistan, India and the United States.

6. The EU as well as the U.S. should support Pakistan in the severe economic crisis, i.e. consider a tariff exemption for textiles now to show goodwill with maximum effect and to support the Pakistani people. The U.S. for too long has alienated the population by supporting unpopular military leaders and following a deal-by-deal approach of carrot and stick which has ruined its image. Therefore Europe should lead and show much more profile in working with Pakistan.

7. The policy toward FATA and the integration of Pakistan into the planning of NATO should come out of Pakistan and must have a Pakistani face. Pakistan must become more self-confident in expressing its will and needs and promoting the discussion about the new security architecture of this region. The military as well as the politicians should be more clear towards the public and teach them that this fight is not a proxy-war for the U.S. but for the vital security of Pakistan and its survival as a prosperous country.

"The Pakistani people also suffer from an extremely weak civilian government and party system and a prevalence of corruption involving too many for too long. The gap between the government and the population is widening and the chances for radicals are increasing. The army is still the glue which holds this large Muslim country with nuclear weapons together. A fresh political reform process within Pakistan seems unavoidable to stabilize the country."

Here you may find the main presentations of the Second FATA Workshop:

• Aims of the WSN-RCDS FATA Workshop by Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President and Founder, World Security Network Foundation
• Proposals for Pilot Projects in FATA by Ali Aurakzai, Former Governor of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Samad Khan, Pakistan Editor, World Security Network
• FATA Scholarship Fund by Ali Aurakzai, Former Governor of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Samad Khan, Pakistan Editor, World Security Network
• How to Control the Money Flow for FATA Projects by Riaz Khokhar, former Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
• NATO in Afghanistan and better Cooperation with Pakistan- by General Karl-Heinz Lather, Chief of Staff, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
• Militants have gained Ground in Pakistan-like in the Swat Valley- by Dr. Humayan Khan, former Foreign Secretary and High Commissioner of Pakistan in London
• The Strategic Triangle: FATA-Pakistan-Afghanistan- by Ambassador Francesc Vendrell, Senior Visiting Fellow at Princeton University and former EU Special Representative to Afghanistan
• Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas: how can the UK support development?- by Judith Kent, Head of Policy, South Asia Strategy and Operations, UK Department for International Development (DfID)
• The people of FATA need development- by Habib Malik Orakzai, Chairman of the Tribal Youth Organization in FATA and Pakistan International Human Rights Organization (PIHRO) and member Afghan-Pak Joint Jirga
• Next Steps in the FATA- by Sir Hilary Synnott, Consulting Senior Fellow for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, former Regional Coordinator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Southern Iraq and former British High Commissioner to Pakistan

More main presentations recorded by WSN TV may be found here:

• The New Strategic Triangle FATA-Pakistan-Afghanistan
  • Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Director-General, Political Directorates, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, former British High Commissioner in Pakistan
  • Sir Richard Dearlove, Master of the Pembroke College, Cambridge, and former Chief of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

• Action required- What are the next steps?
  • Sir Paul Lever, Chairman of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) and former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

Several participants provided papers for discussion:

• General (Retd) Rainer Schuwirth, former Chief of Staff SHAPE
• Owen Bennett Jones, journalist BBC online
• Commander M.W. Ewence, Royal Navy U.K.
• John Leech, European Coordinator West-West Agenda, UK
• Carsten Michels, Editor, World Security Network
• Victoria Schofield, Writer
• Abubakar Siddique, Presenter, Radio Free Europe

More information about the attitudes of the population towards governance, religion and society in FATA can be found at www.understandingfata.org

Further background information from the FATA Secretariat about development in FATA can be found here: FATA Development Briefing January 2009

All speeches and documents can be found under www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/FATA

Do not hesitate to add your own ideas about FATA and mail me your thoughts to president@worldsecuritynetwork.com "Networking a Safer World" together.

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President and Founder of the World Security Network Foundation, - here at the famous Khyber Pass in the tribal areas - presented his idea of a GCC-EU FATA Friendship Fund at the WSN FATA Round Table in Berlin in May 2008 promoting a double strategy with the focus on separating the majority of peaceful tribemen from the few radicals and much more engagement of the European and Gulf states to develop with Pakistan this strategic important region now.

In the famous Hotel Adlon at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, the independent non-profit World Security Network Foundation launched a fresh fact-finding FATA Round Table and a concrete initiative to stabilise the fragile situation in the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan on the border to Afghanistan.

More than 50 high ranking experts, generals, ambassadors and politicians from Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the U.S. discussed the situation and its relationships to Afghanistan, and out of this process, a new double strategy of development and containment for this very important hot-spot in the world took shape: the GCC-EU FATA Friendship Fund (see the presentation here).

WSN – besides networking the young global elite in foreign affairs – wants to discuss the most pressing issues openly and without taboos, and promote fresh new ideas in global affairs - outside the box of administrations and standard paths. “Networking a Safer World” using the tools of effective entrepreneurs and the know how of its international network of experts.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with its 3.5m inhabitants of several fiercely independent Pashtun tribes are important for three strategic goals:

• Homeland Security: Containment of the recruitment and training of new terrorists and activities of Al Qaeda elements which threaten Europe, the United States, the Gulf Countries and other states. Osama bin Laden most probably hides here with other Al Qaeda leaders.
• Stabilization of Pakistan: Neutralization of the increasingly destabilizing effects of terrorism and radicalization for the democratic government of Pakistan.
• Stabilization of Afghanistan: Reduce the cross-border threat by the Taliban forces to the military missions of NATO and stability in Afghanistan which use this area for recruitment and refreshment.

The tribal areas are the most important hinterland of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban and therefore crucial for homeland security and a successful NATO mission – they are also a bleeding wound for Pakistan which suffers most directly and continuously.

Deputy U.S. Secretary of State John Negroponte named his latest excellent testimony on May 20, 2008 at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “Pakistan’s FATA Challenges: Securing one of the World Most Dangerous Areas” (see his testimony here).

On June 10, 2008 the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen told reporters: “I believe fundamentally that if the U.S. is going to get hit, it is going to come out of the planning of the leadership (of Al Qaeda) in FATA. That is the threat to us that must be dealt with.” (see Militants from Pakistan most likely authors of future U.S. attacks, in Daily Times June 11, 2008 )

The threats are precise but still the messages from civilian and military decisionmakers in Washington, Europe and at NATO engaged in homeland security and the war in Afghanistan are unclear: Should you bomb the radicals or build up trust in the tribal areas? Should Islamabad sign peace treaties, or does this constitute appeasement vis-à-vis the Taliban and terrorists?

More than six years after Operation “Enduring Freedom” started in Afghanistan, the U.S. had neither transfered any money for FATA development – as promised by President Bush to Pakistan President Musharraf two years ago – nor shaped an overall political FATA Plan to contain terrorism and the Taliban - nor did NATO or the Europeans.

There is still no FATA strategy of the West and no funding has been provided – a deadly vacuum used by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This dire situation may change now in the U.S. administration and also needs much more attention and support by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the EU states as well.

In his testimony John Negroponte promised again a $ 750m support package with $ 150m spent per year to fund economic growth and education. But this money is still blocked in the long legislation process on the Hill. In fiscal year 2007 the United States government has started to spend $ 100m each year for implementing the separate Security Development Plan as a six-year multi-faceted program to enhance Pakistan's ability to secure its border with Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Washington has many times criticized ceasefires and peace treaties by the new Islamabad government with Taliban elements, and also used more U.S. Predator strikes against suspected terrorist hide-outs, there. Unfortunately, there are strong indications that such air strikes have not been conducive to a counter-insurgency strategy that engages the local population. Fifty civilians have been killed by U.S. air strikes this year alone, among them 11 Pakistani soldiers in the most severe incident in the Mohmand tribal area, June 10, 2008.

It is time now to find a solid new strategy of the U.S., NATO and Europe for the FATA in order to address the three important issues involved: the ongoing anti-terror campaign and the stabilization of both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President of the World Security Network Foundation, presents the GCC-EU FATA Friendship Fund in the WSN FATA Workshop in Berlin

During this first international WSN FATA workshop in Europe it became clear that the war in Afghanistan and the development in Pakistan and its border region are inseparably linked to each other. There can be no isolated solution for FATA without progress in Afghanistan and no stability in the FATA and Pakistan without peace in Afghanistan. This aspect was underlined in Berlin by the German Lt General (ret) Götz Gliemeroth, who served as one of the first ISAF Commanders in Afghanistan 2003/2004 and is a member of the WSN International Advisory Board.

The several high representatives of Pakistan participating in WSN’s workshop emphasized that the war in Afghanistan has had negative repercussions for Pakistan for 30 years since the Soviet invasion in 1978 and Pakistan had to bear the main burden of it until now – not the West. About six million Afghani refugees had to be absorbed, of which 2.5 million are still in the country as largest refugee community in the world. Not Pakistan but Afghanistan, they argue, is exporting terrorism and destabilization. The Afghani government is not doing enough to seal the border to the FATA and has too few troops near it, while Pakistan, with 100,000 soldiers deployed, has a 40 times higher troop concentration in the tribal areas than the Afghani government and ISAF have opposite to it. The Afghanistan government is even against measures such as sealing the border or instituting modern biometric passports. The Pakistani representatives thus say: do not blame Islamabad for infiltration but the responsible forces in Afghanistan.

The audience agreed that the blame games between Washington and Kabul on one side and Islamabad on the other must end and are counterproductive for the tasks at hand. The open criticism in the U.S. to do more is only weakening the position of those elements who want to do exactly this and inflames anti-Western emotions.

At the same time the Pakistani government must continue to contain the militants with intelligence operations and military power as otherwise the vacuum will be used by the radical forces.

Therefore the workshop was about formulating a double strategy for the FATA, a combination of power and reconciliation like the successful Harmel Report in 1967 of NATO which was the base for winning the Cold War by combining deterrence with détente and arms control with strong defence capabilities.

A consensus emerged that the main strategic task and top priority is to isolate the vast majority of 83 percent of peaceful inhabitants from the only one percent of fighters and maximum 17 percent of potential radicals, as done late but successfully in the Anbar province in Iraq.

Everyone also agreed that the containment of terrorism and the Taliban cannot be done by military means alone but requires carefully planed political and development approaches.

The FATA are crucial for the success of NATO and the U.S. in Afghanistan and the containment of terrorist threats. A new double strategy of power and reconciliation is needed not only for the FATA but also for Afghanistan to counter the Taliban and terrorism with more success.

The historically independent tribal areas – which are a part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan – are still one of the world’s poorest areas, far below the average of other parts of Pakistan. Because of the Western military action in Afghanistan in 2001/2002, the Taliban and other extremist groups – like Al Qaeda – infiltrated the FATA and are now destroying the historically grown tribal structure by executing militant command and control in large parts. More than 500 maliks, the tribal elders, have been killed until now by them.

The high rate of unemployment – especially among young people – along with the high rate of poverty, the propaganda against the so-called “occupation forces” in Afghanistan, and finally the so-called “collateral damage” inflicted by US air strikes on locals, made the FATA a perfect breeding ground for the “Neo-Taliban” and other extremists groups.

It has therefore become easy for the “Neo-Taliban “and other terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to recruit new fighters and even suicide bombers by offering incentives – such as jobs and payment – and allowing the financial support of the poor families while appealing to fight the foreigners. The participants of the workshop came to the unanimous conclusion that much more has to be done to tackle the problems of unemployment and lack of education now and that the West has now lost more than six years without a credible FATA strategy.

Lt General (ret) Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai was the governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) until January 2008 and the FATA Administrator for the Pakistan government as well as Corps Commander in Peshawar, and had also negotiated the North Waziristan peace agreement in 2006. (see the manuscript of his speech at the WSN FATA Round Table here) He informed the audience about the recent developments and the efforts in FATA to build up political and administrative structures. Before 9/11 the tribes lived in peace with each other and their neighbours. In December 2001 the tribesmen for the first time ever opened inaccessable areas of more than 5,000 square kilometres for the Pakistan Army and joined in fighting Al Qaeda, who fled from Tora Bora during operation Enduring Freedom. 8,000 troops from Pakistan sealed the border and killed more than 200 core Al Qaeda fighters. Since then 700 militants have been killed including 240 Arab fighters, while Pakistan has lost 1,800 soldiers with 3,000 wounded. Now there is a post every two kilometres at the border to Afghanistan and patrols. Yet many more Afghani troops should be deployed at the border with a real sharing of intelligence and military leadership. Pakistan has now 100,000 troops in the FATA, but the Afghanis and the West have far too few troops on Afghani soil to contain and stop the Taliban.

Lt General (ret) Ali Aurakzai,
Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Peshawar, Pakistan until January 2008 responsible for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), about the developments in FATA

Ali Aurakzai went on to say that in order to win the hearts and minds of the tribesmen one should know their mentality of chivalry, honour, revenge, social equality and humanity. The tribesmen are conservative but not fundamentalists. They have been suspicious of foreigners for more than 1,000 years and have fought all invaders in history with much success. Therefore there is a strong anti-Foreigner and anti-Western and especially anti-U.S. feeling. When air strikes were introduced by the U.S. in the FATA the early support of the tribes was lost and their trust as well. When only one tribesman is killed, the entire tribe is obligated to revenge. They started to turn against the West and also the Pakistani forces. Problems are usually solved by the very effective system of tribal meetings, the Jirgas. Therefore this system and peace contracts should be used.

The Pakistan government and the West did not pay attention to development in this strategically important region. In 1999 and 2000 only $ 14m were spent each year to support economic development. For the first time ever in 2006 governor Aurakzai asked the tribes what they need and want to develop their region. Out of this came the Sustainable Development Plan (SDP), which envisions aid and investment of $ 2.06 bn to stimulate education and development. The target is to bring up the literacy rate from the current level of 16 percent to more than 50 percent in nine years, and to explore the area for rich minerals and coal. But although the U.S., the European states and the Gulf partners have a strategic interest in the FATA, until now “we haven’t got anything yet”.

FATA expert Ali Aurakzai recommends: do not see the FATA in isolation but look for a solution in Afghanistan where the problems come from. Renew the Grand Peace Jirga of Pakistan and Afghanistan, open the doors for a dialogue with all elements in the Jirgas, sign a ceasefire during the negotiations, start a massive development program to win the hearts and minds, strengthen the traditional institutions and support elements of democracy which fit to Afghanistan, significantly increase support to Pakistan as this country has suffered for 30 years, give the peace treaties a chance and be more patient with results. Only selective military operations are useful not massive air strikes and no withdrawal of Pakistani troops should take place. The man in the villages of the tribal areas must benefit from the program. The SDP needs full support to ensure its implementation. The core group are the young men between 15-17 years looking for jobs. Education must be given a top priority.

General (ret.) Ehsan ul Haq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Pakistani Military (2004-2007), Director of ISI (2001- 2004), Corps Commander in Peshawar in 2000 and a WSN Advisory Board member – (see the manuscript of his speech at the WSN FATA Round Table here) argued that Pakistan paid the price and became a victim of the Kalashnikov culture and the largest refugee problem in the world. The security forces are under attack and the country has been destabilized by the turmoil in Afghanistan. More than 35,000 Mujaheddin were in the FATA in the 1980s fighting the Soviet Union, with massive support from the West and the Gulf states. The Madrassas were foreign-funded to recruit more of them. Today the cultural ethos has deteriorated, as seen by suicide attacks against mosques and funerals. The radicals are highly mobile, well trained and equipped, and funded with foreigners as technical support. There can be no military solution for the FATA but only a strategy to win the hearts and minds of the people. We have to address the roots of the problem, which are political, and isolate the negative elements with a clear understanding of their mindset. The local administration has to be strengthened with an urgent need for healing.

General (ret.) Ehsan ul Haq, former Chairman of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff, about Pakistan and the FATA

General (ret.) Ehsan ul Haq, former Chairman of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the Tribal Areas and Pakistan

It was German General (ret) Dr. h.c. Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO Military Committee and Chief of Staff of the German Bundeswehr, and also a Member of the WSN Advisory Board, who asked to integrate the new FATA module into a wider concept for the region. A two-track approach of development and implementation of counterinsurgency strategies which will be accepted by the people is imperative. We all have to look for objectives and interests of the parties involved to find a solution. The development has to come from the wish list of the people – and can not be imposed on them – and needs to focus on the young generation. Too much money has been eaten up by international organizations in Afghanistan with little progress. Unfortunately many NGOs and international organizations are more interested in their own jobs than quick progress and building lasting structures embedded into local society and institutions.

General (ret) Dr. h.c. Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO Military Committee, about FATA

For the former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (2002- 2005) Riaz Khokhar, “Human Resource Development” is the key for any progress. Education has to get first priority. The people wish to get education, as shown recently when 5,000 students, including 1,500 girls, turned up in Peshawar to get one of 200 scholarships for education. One focus should be simple training for jobs like plumbers or electricians. Those qualified craftsmen could work in the Gulf states, make money there and thus support their families in the tribal areas. Health and water management should also be addressed. He has no concerns about the capacity of the FATA Administration. The successful Earthquake Authority in Pakistan can be used as a best practise. The accountability should rest with the FATA Development Authority and not with new organizations. He proposed to keep the U.S. out of the FATA development because of strong resentments of the tribes and focus on support by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Europeans under the umbrella of the Pakistan FATA Authority.

Riaz Khokhar, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, about the Tribal Areas

Saudi entrepreneur Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai (see www.grc.ae) argued that the West has failed in Afghanistan. The power of Afghani President Karzai is limited to Kabul and his own security apparatus is infiltrated by the Taliban, as shown recently by the attack on him. The GCC should, hand in hand with European countries and the EU, support Pakistan and the tribal areas. In her presentation Pakistan expert Faryal Leghari, researcher at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, offered detailed proposals for FATA projects in the economic, energy, agriculture, health care, energy sectors as well as proposals how to improve the “transport” infrastructure. In her view implementation should go through Pakistani officials at all levels. (see the manuscript of her speech at the WSN FATA Round Table here)

Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Dubai, about FATA

Sir Paul Lever, Chairman of the Royal United Services Institute in London, mentioned the dramatic threat of terrorist from the tribal areas for the United Kingdom. 30 conspiracy plots with 2,000 individuals potentially involved and 200 individuals on trial have been counted in the UK, with most of the plotters being of Pakistani origin and some having trained mostly in the tribal areas. Therefore the UK has an enormous interest to eliminate the virus of terrorism by helping the development in the FATA.

Sir Paul Lever, Chairman of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, about FATA

He was seconded by Dr. August Hanning, State Secretary of the German Federal Ministry of Interior, and former Director of the Federal Intelligence Agency (BND), who argued that internal and external security cannot be left separate any more. (see the manuscript of his speech at the WSN FATA Round Table here)

In July 2006 the so called “Sauerland” bombers wanted to blow up two trains in Germany with connections to training in the tribal areas. He sees risks that young Muslims in Europe will be radicalized and may be trained there. Dr. Hanning argued: "Germany too has a potential for home-grown terrorism, as in the case of the suspects arrested in the German area of Sauerland: A year ago, who would have thought that a suspected Islamist terrorist would go by the typically German name of "Fritz"? The recent Internet video by a suspected jihadist from Germany is especially unsettling: In the video, a young man from Saarland, who was also in contact with the Sauerland terrorist suspects, calls for holy war. We can assume that this video was filmed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region."

Dr. August Hanning, State Secretary of the German Federal Ministry of Interior, about terrorist threats from FATA

The German political point of view was presented by Eckart von Klaeden (see the manuscript of this speech at the FATA Round Table here), young and influential Foreign Affairs spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union in the German Bundestag and member of the CDU Presidential Committee. He stressed the point that there is a direct threat through terrorist attacks in Germany and an indirect threat via Afghanistan.

Eckart von Klaeden, Foreign Affairs Spokesman of the CDU/CSU in German Parliament, about Pakistan and FATA

Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) an influencial member of the Defence Committee of the Bundestag agreed and stressed the need for a dual strategy for the FATA and a fresh approach for development: "There is no security without development and no development without security !"

Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP), member of the Bundestag Defense Committee, about combining security with development

The World Security Network Foundation presented its new plan for a GCC- EU FATA Friendship Fund (see the presentation here) to help to improve the situation of the 3.5 m poor people living in the FATA:

• A new FATA double strategy of Pakistan, the U.S., the Europeans, NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council to address the issue of homeland security and stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a combination of power and reconciliation combining hawk and dove with the clear focus to separate the few radicals from the majority of peaceful inhabitants in the FATA

• Embedded into an overall peace approach for Afghanistan, Pakistan and India with a focus on strengthening joint interests in stability and limiting the impact of contradictory national interests. Promoting of a Grand Peace Jirga of Pakistan and Afghanistan hosted by the GCC and more India-Pakistan talks orchestrated by the EU and the U.S.

• End of the blame game and public pushing by the U.S.; build-up of better working relations with Pakistan intelligence and military and more effective cooperation at the Afghanistan border region including maybe fencing and more troops on the Afghan side

• Very low profile of the U.S., low profile of the EU, and higher profile by the Islamic GCC and full support for the Pakistani government and FATA Authority

• Quick start for a GCC-EU FATA Friendship Fund with € 1 bn to support the development in the FATA and the SDP Plan of the Pakistani government. Financed with € 100m per year each from GCC and EU for five years embedded into the expected U.S. funding of $ 150m per year

• Focus on projects for education (schools and handcrafts) and economic growth (agriculture, small businesses, micro credit). GCC should invite many thousands of craftsmen to work in the Gulf countries and bring money back with them

• Quick results for people in the villages needed with first projects to be identified in 2008

• Full integration into existing SDP planning and empowerment of the FATA Authority including a new technical team of experts there to control results and funding. Supplement to U.S. funding for FATA

• Homeland Security: additional funding (more than $ 100m per year) to strengthen the Frontier Corps in Pakistan, intelligence and military capacities versus the radicals and better results in cooperation with the Pakistanis

• Silent unofficial freeze of U.S. air strikes as they produce more radicals than they may kill and are counter-productive to the main aim of separating the majority of the peaceful tribesmen from the few radicals. Focus on better cooperation with Pakistan counter insurgency and intelligence. Keep the Predator strike option as a rare exception open for deterrence

• Give the peace treaties a chance and integrate them into on overall strategy. They must also take homeland security and stabilization in Afghanistan into account

With such a fresh approach, peace in the tribal areas has a chance and the national interests of the Gulf states, the U.S., the Europeans as well as of Pakistan and Afghanistan are served better than in the past. A new double strategy could address the three problems emerging from the FATA effectively.

With the imminent assumption of the EU Presidency by France, a country that has many troops in Afghanistan and has recently committed to send even more, such an initiative should be placed where it belongs: at the top of the international security policy agenda.

More informations about FATA you may find in the following documents:

• GCC-EU FATA Friendship Fund
• FATA Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) 2006-2015
• Facts about FATA
• Presentation on Development in FATA
• Presentation FATA Development Authority
• Presentation of the Implementation of Peace Plan in NWFP
• Presentation Overview of the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones for Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan
• The GCC- EU FATA Friendship Plan - Gulf Research Center Dubai

FATA—A Most Dangerous Place

Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

It is our pleasure to provide you with the new White Paper of the White House Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, presented by U.S. President Barack Obama on March 27, 2009 with a fresh new approach towards Afghanistan and Pakistan - now called AfPak - which is in line with many of the recommendations of the World Security Network Foundation for FATA, Pakistan and Afghanistan as promoted for many years (see our newsletters below).

Please read the text of this important document and the WSN proposals here:

U.S. President Barack Obama: "The core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan."

The United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, al Qaeda and other groups of jihadist terrorists are planning new terror attacks. Their targets remain the U.S. homeland, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, our allies in the Middle East, and other targets of opportunity. The growing size of the space in which they are operating is a direct result of the terrorist/insurgent activities of the Taliban and related organizations. At the same time, this group seeks to reestablish their old sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

The ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan. The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and our allies in Pakistan - including the possibility of extremists obtaining fissile material - is all too real. Without more effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability.

Objectives

Achieving our core goal is vital to U.S. national security. It requires, first of all, realistic and achievable objectives. These include:

• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.
• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.
• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.
• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.
• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.

A New Way Forward

These are daunting tasks. They require a new way of thinking about the challenges, a wide ranging diplomatic strategy to build support for our efforts, enhanced engagement with the publics in the region and at home, and a realization that all elements of international power - diplomatic, informational, military and economic - must be brought to bear. They will also require a significant change in the management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance.

Our diplomatic effort should be based on building a clear consensus behind the common core goal and supporting objectives. To this end, we will explore creating new diplomatic mechanisms, including establishing a "Contact Group" and a regional security and economic cooperation forum. The trilateral U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan effort of February 24-26, 2009 will be continued and broadened, into the next meeting planned for early May, in Washington.

The United States must overcome the 'trust deficit' it faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner. We must engage the Afghan people in ways that demonstrate our commitment to promoting a legitimate and capable Afghan government with economic progress. We must engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.

A strategic communications program must be created, made more effective, and resourced. This new strategy will have no chance of success without better civil-military coordination by U.S. agencies, a significant increase of civilian resources, and a new model of how we allocate and use these resources. For too long, U.S. and international assistance efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered from being ill-organized and significantly under-resourced in some areas. A large portion of development assistance ends up being spent on international consultants and overhead, and virtually no impact assessments have yet been done on our assistance programs.

We must ensure that our assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan is aligned with our core goals and objectives. This will involve assistance that is geared to strengthening government capacity and the message that assistance will be limited without the achievement of results.

Additional assistance to Afghanistan must be accompanied by concrete mechanisms to ensure greater government accountability. In a country that is 70 percent rural, and where the Taliban recruiting base is primarily among under-employed youths, a complete overhaul of our civilian assistance strategy is necessary; agricultural sector job creation is an essential first step to undercutting the appeal of al Qaeda and its allies. Increased assistance to Pakistan will be limited without a greater willingness to cooperate with us to eliminate the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda and other extremist groups, as well as a greater commitment to economic reforms that will raise the living standard of ordinary Pakistanis, including in the border regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

The following steps must be done in concert to produce the desired end state: the removal of al-Qaeda's sanctuary, effective democratic government control in Pakistan, and a self-reliant Afghanistan that will enable a withdrawal of combat forces while sustaining our commitment to political and economic development.

• Executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan

"Increasing economic assistance to Pakistan - to include direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments - and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims"

Our military forces in Afghanistan, including those recently approved by the President, should be utilized for two priority missions: 1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al Qaeda and its allies, to provide a space for the Afghani government to establish effective government control and 2) providing the Afghan security forces with the mentoring needed to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow us and our partners to wind down our combat operations.

Our counter-insurgency strategy must integrate population security with building effective local governance and economic development. We will establish the security needed to provide space and time for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

To prevent future attacks on the U.S. and its allies - including the local populace - the development of a strategic communications strategy to counter the terror information campaign is urgent. This has proved successful in Iraq (where the U.S. military has made a significant effort in this area) and should be developed in Afghanistan as a top priority to improve the image of the United States and its allies. The strategic communications plan -- including electronic media, telecom, and radio -- shall include options on how best to counter the propaganda that is key to the enemy's terror campaign.

• Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan

By increasing civilian capacity we will strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A dramatic increase in Afghan civilian expertise is needed to facilitate the development of systems and institutions particularly at the provincial and local levels, provide basic infrastructure, and create economic alternatives to the insurgency at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in agriculture. The United States should play an important part in providing that expertise, but responding effectively to Afghanistan's needs will require that allies, partners, the UN and other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations significantly increase their involvement in Afghanistan.

• Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces: Army and Police

To be capable of assuming the security mission from U.S. forces in Afghanistan's south and east, the Afghan National Security Forces must substantially increase its size and capability. Initially this will require a more rapid build-up of the Afghan Army and police up to 134,000 and 82,000 over the next two years, with additional enlargements as circumstances and resources warrant.

The international community must assume responsibility for funding this significantly enhanced Afghan security force for an extended period. We will also have to provide support for other Afghan security forces such as the Afghan Public Protection Force. Salaries paid to Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police must become more competitive with those paid by the insurgents.

Over time, as security conditions change, we should continue to reassess Afghan National Security Forces size, as it will be affected by such factors as: the overall security situation, the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces, and the rate at which we can grow local security forces and integrate them into the overall ANSF structure.

• Engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy

International support for the election will be necessary for a successful outcome. We should do everything necessary to ensure the security and legitimacy of voter registration, elections, and vote counting. The international military presence should help the Afghan security forces provide security before, during and after the election. International monitoring will also be required to ensure legitimacy and oversee Afghanistan's polling sites.

The overall legitimacy of the Afghan government is also undermined by rampant corruption and a failure to provide basic services to much of the population over the past 7 years. Where Afghan systems and institutions have benefited from high quality technical assistance and

mentoring, they have made great progress. Making such support more consistent with qualified mentors to advise and monitor officials, pushing such efforts to the provincial and district levels, and channeling more assistance through Afghan institutions benefiting from this high quality support will help restore and maintain the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

• Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents

While Mullah Omar and the Taliban's hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution.

Practical integration must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights. We can help this process along by exploiting differences among the insurgents to divide the Taliban's true believers from less committed fighters.

Integration must be Afghan-led. An office should be created in every province and we should support efforts by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance to develop a reconciliation effort targeting mid-to-low level insurgents to be led by provincial governors. We should also explore ways to rehabilitate captured insurgents drawing on lessons learned from similar programs in Iraq and other countries.

• Including provincial and local governments in our capacity building efforts

We need to work with the Afghan government to refocus civilian assistance and capacity-building programs on building up competent provincial and local governments where they can more directly serve the people and connect them to their government.

• Breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency

"There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave. In 2009-2010 the Taliban's momentum must be reversed in Afghanistan and the international community must work with Pakistan to disrupt the threats to security along Pakistan's western border."

Besides the global consequences of the drug trade, the Afghan narcotics problem causes great concern due to its ties to the insurgency, the fact that it is the major driver of corruption in Afghanistan, and distorts the legal economy. The NATO/International Security Assistance Forces and U.S. forces should use their authorities to directly support Afghan counternarcotics units during the interdiction of narco-traffickers. The new authorities permit the destruction of labs, drug storage facilities, drug processing equipment, and drug caches and should contribute to breaking the drug-insurgency funding nexus and the corruption associated with the opium/heroin trade. Crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs that are a key pillar of effectively countering narcotics have been disastrously underdeveloped and under-resourced, however, and the narcotics trade will persist until such programs allow Afghans to reclaim their land for licit agriculture. Targeting those who grow the poppy will continue, but the focus will shift to higher level drug lords.

• Mobilizing greater international political support of our objectives in Afghanistan

We need to do more to build a shared understanding of what is at stake in Afghanistan, while engaging other actors and offering them the opportunity to advance our mutual interests by cooperating with us.

• Bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation

We need to institutionalize stronger mechanisms for bilateral and trilateral cooperation. During the process of this review, inter-agency teams from Afghanistan and Pakistan came to Washington, DC for trilateral meetings. This new forum should continue and serve as the basis for enhanced bilateral and trilateral cooperation.

• Engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat

Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will also require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistani leadership in both the civilian and military spheres. The engagement must be conducted in a way that respects, and indeed enhances, democratic civilian authority.

• Assisting Pakistan's capability to fight extremists

It is vital to strengthen our efforts to both develop and operationally enable Pakistani security forces so they are capable of succeeding in sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In part this will include increased U.S. military assistance for helicopters to provide air mobility, night vision equipment, and training and equipment specifically for Pakistani Special Operation Forces and their Frontier Corps.

• Increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan

Increasing economic assistance to Pakistan - to include direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments - and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims;

it should also help to provide longer-term economic stability. Our assistance should focus on long-term capacity building, on agricultural sector job creation, education and training, and on infrastructure requirements. Assistance should also support Pakistani efforts to 'hold and build' in western Pakistan as a part of its counterinsurgency efforts.

• Exploring other areas of economic cooperation with Pakistan

We need to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities, in part through implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (which were recently re-introduced in Congress) and encouraging foreign investment in key sectors, such as energy. In addition, assisting Islamabad with developing a concrete strategy for utilizing donor aid would increase Islamabad's chances for garnering additional support from the international community.

• Strengthening Pakistani government capacity

Strengthening the civilian, democratic government must be a centerpiece of our overall effort. Key efforts should include fostering the reform of provincial and local governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province. We need to help Islamabad enhance the services and support in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from returning to those areas.

With international partners, we should also promote the development of regional organizations that focus on economic and security cooperation, as well as fostering productive political dialogue.

• Asking for assistance from allies for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Our efforts are a struggle against forces that pose a direct threat to the entire international community. While reaching out to allies and partners for their political support, we should also ask them to provide the necessary resources to accomplish our shared objectives. They have the same interest in denying terrorists and extremists sanctuaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan that we do. In approaching allies we should emphasize that our new approach is integrated between civilian and military elements and in looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan as one theater for diplomacy.

For the mission in Afghanistan, we should continue to seek contributions for combat forces, trainers and mentors, strategic lift, and equipment from our friends and allies. The U.S. will also pursue major international funding and experts for civilian reconstruction and Afghan government capacity building at the national and especially the provincial and local levels.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan should take the lead in exploring ways that donors could systematically share the burden of building Afghan capacity and providing civilian expertise. As part of its coordination role for civilian assistance, the UN should consolidate requests and identify gaps.

In Pakistan, the U.S. will urge allies to work closely with us both bilaterally and through the 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' to coordinate economic and development assistance,

including additional direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments. Similarly, we should ask them to provide technical advice and assistance in strengthening government capacity, such as improving Pakistani institutions.

Conclusion

There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave. In 2009-2010 the Taliban's momentum must be reversed in Afghanistan and the international community must work with Pakistan to disrupt the threats to security along Pakistan's western border.

This new strategy of focusing on our core goal - to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually destroy extremists and their safe havens within both nations, although with different tactics - will require immediate action, sustained commitment, and substantial resources. The United States is committed to working with our partners in the region and the international community to address this challenging but essential security goal.

White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan from March 27, 2009