The ongoing lack of progress in formulating a Lebanese national defense strategy reveals the existence of a fundamental disagreement regarding internal power-arrangements as well as concerning the role Lebanon should assume in the region. On the one hand, the ruling anti-Syrian "March 14" coalition has been advocating for the normalization of the internal military-power distribution by disarming all armed groups, and for the adoption of a more neutral role within the region. On the other hand, the Hezbollah-led opposition forces have been stressing the need to preserve a defense model based on the concept of popular resistance and active engagements.

The current impasse seems unlikely to be resolved in the upcoming months preceding the June 2009 parliamentary elections, and-in the event of a victory of the opposition forces-the majority coalition's disarmament plan would quickly loose most of its political credibility. In this sense, the March 14's window of opportunity to promote its defense strategy and vision for the country may be shrinking as the elections approach.

The fourth round of national reconciliation talks took place on January 26, 2009 and concluded without the achievement of any concrete result. Organized by President Michel Suleiman and attended by 14 representatives of Lebanon's major political parties; the talks had the ambitious agenda of formulating a comprehensive national defense strategy for Lebanon, tackling the regulation of armed militias and "resistance" groups, including Hezbollah. In the course of the talks the issue of disarming the "resistance" emerged as the most difficult one to resolve, emphasizing a profound disagreement between opposition and majority forces.

March 14 leaders have been promoting the idea of disarmament of all militias and armed groups alike, including the powerful Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Former President and leader of the Kataeb (Phalanges) Party Amin Gemayel clearly expressed this position during a Beirut rally on December 15, 2008: "Loyalty to Lebanon... should be manifested in severing relations with external [forces], respecting the state's sovereignty, putting an end to separatism, surrendering illegal weapons (...) The country cannot tolerate any illegal military presence within its borders. [Lebanon cannot tolerate] Hizbullah's weapons in the South"

Moreover, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea, also concurring with this view, submitted a defense proposal aimed at disarming all militias and reforming the Lebanese Armed Forces (LF) on the basis of the Swiss model. Dr. Geagea proposed to boost the LAF by enhancing the size and combat tactics of the Lebanese Special Forces, and he suggested the integration of this military strategy with a diplomatic policy of "active neutrality." Finally, March 14 MP Boutros Harb also suggested the dismantlement of Hezbollah's military wing, pushing for its progressive incorporation into the LAF through the creation of paramilitary "border guards" units to be placed under the LAF's control.

The March 14 coalition plans are however in complete contrast with the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition's vision of the country and the role "resistance" groups should be playing. Hezbollah has been arguing that retaining their weapons constitutes one of their legitimate rights, and it has been aggressively campaigning to "generalize the resistance strategy across the political spectrum." Similarly, the group has rejected the calls to play a more neutral role in the Middle East. In this sense, head of the Hezbollah's Executive Council Al-Sayyid Hashim Safi al-Din expressed his organization's rejection of any disarmament plan, and-addressing the Lebanese Forces' "neutrality proposal"-said: "returning to the strategy of neutrality is like returning to an old, outdated and failed position. The neutrality they are proposing led to the enemy's occupation of our land, and the tragedies of our people."

Although Hezbollah did not submit a formal defense proposal in the course of the ongoing national dialogue, it is however clear that the organization endorses a very specific defense model, based on the concept of "resistance," which it holds to be the only viable defense strategy against Israeli aggressions. Hezbollah's Shaykh Kassem emphasized that the organization does not see the disarmament option as a realistic one, given the current geo-political context, and added that following the May 2008 national reconciliation agreement signed in Doha (Qatar) "the door was closed against three difficult and complicated years which started with the unfortunate international resolution 1559" (the UN Security Council Resolution asking Lebanon to dismantle its militias and armed groups).

This resistance model has been gaining additional political power and popular resilience in the aftermath of the recent Israeli military operations in Gaza-as recognized by March 14 MP Carlos Edde, who stated that Hezbollah could benefit politically from the War in Gaza.

These latest developments are particularly problematic for the March 14 coalition and for its national unity and disarmament project. In fact, Hezbollah is gaining additional political backing for its armed wing and it is actively promoting the idea that: "what happened in Gaza emphasizes the role of the Resistance and its arms as an essential and indispensable pillar in protecting Lebanon." This concept of "popular resistance" is also backed by Hezbollah's political ally and leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun, who submitted a national defense plan based on this notion. Moreover, the Shia-group is also escalating its rhetoric concerning its right to retain weapons. For example, the group recently declared that it would not forgo its weapons until all Palestine is liberated-a statement that is particularly worrisome for the majority coalition, as it seems to imply that even the complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon (including the Sheba Farms) would not lead the organization to give up its weapons, thus contradicting its previous posture.

In sum, March 14 forces currently find themselves under intense pressure to preserve the political credibility and support for their disarmament plan. Moreover, the situation could worsen as time progresses, and the disarmament option could become increasingly weak and unrealistic, especially in the event of a victory of March 8 forces in the upcoming June 2, 2009 elections.

As explained by Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on December 18: "The next parliamentary election is not about seats for the majority and seats for the minority. Rather, it is about political options over which the parties differ. (...)We are clear: Our political option stands on pillars that we declare loud and clear. (...) [w]e stress the need for permanent readiness to build a strong army, a strong resistance, and a strong people to resist the Israeli occupation and threat, to reject the settlement [of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon], and to work persistently to confront the challenges that Israel imposes thorough its aggression on Lebanon."

Druze leader Walid Jumblatt showed a similar understanding of the political significance of the next elections by stating: "Now more than ever, the movement for a free, independent and sovereign Lebanon... and a (state) monopoly over weapons and equal relations with Syria are at risk (...)."