National Armament Directors (NAD)

Posted in NATO | 05-Jun-03 | Source: NATO´S Nations

Where are we and how to transfer resolutions into industrial reality
  1. Which implications are you facing after the Capabilities and Transformation Summit in Prague? Your contribution to PCC (Prague Commitment) and NRF (NATO Response Force)?
  2. What is your reaction to the requirements regarding anti-terrorism and asymmetric threats? Your efforts?
  3. Please name technology fields where your country is going to increase its efforts (f.e. Information Warfare, Air Defence, Precision Guided Munitions, Reconnaissance, Inter-Operability, Search and Rescue, UAV, CSAR, Sealift, Mobility, Net Centric Warfare, CBRN, Air Transport, Logistics, Simulation and Training, Airborne Early Warning, C4, EW).
  4. Where do you see technology gaps to the US (if) and can you identify national programs and/or equipment use by US-Forces or prime contractors, where your country did contribute? Where do you feel competitive or even superior to the US partner?
  5. What is your policy towards your own industrial base (f.e. R+D funding, international cooperation, technology transfer and private partnership, export assistance)?
  6. How are your experiences regarding cooperation between NATO and Partner for Peace (PfP) countries? To what extent is your involvement in CNAD beneficial for you?
  7. The US-administration is practicing some technology restrictions. How is this effecting transatlantic cooperation, standardization and flow of information?



Major General G. ANDRIES,
National Armaments Director
Belgium
Strength of Belgium:

Highly competitive satellite launch technology

  • deployability
  • survivability
  • information superiority

GDP 2003 / $: 267,7 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 3,076 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 47,350




  1. The Prague Summit incited us to an increased focus on programs improving performance in areas such as deployability, survivability and information superiority. Our contribution to the NRF will be based on a fair share of burden, risk and responsibility.

  2. Terrorism and asymmetric threats require a co-ordinated multinational and interdepartmental approach and a greater emphasis on intelligence and survivability. Our military contribution includes programs regarding for instance CBRN defence, communication and surveillance.

  3. Efforts will be increased in areas such as information superiority (e.g. participation in multinational satellite programs), CBRN Defence (e.g. collective protection), combat effectiveness (e.g. PGM-related acquisition programs) and deployability / sustainability (e.g. A-400M).

  4. Apparent technology gaps are those regarding the telecommunication and avionics sectors. On the other hand, the Belgian industry contributed to several US programs (e.g. MINIMI, SEA SPARROW, display systems) and is involved in the highly competitive European satellite launch technology.

  5. The Belgian MoD is striving for international cooperation and technology transfer through multinational R&T activities within organizations such as NATO and WEAG and major co-production programs. Feasibility studies on private partnership are ongoing.

  6. Cooperation with PfP Countries is growing significantly and encouraging results appear at all levels of the CNAD structure. CNAD provides us with unique opportunities for cooperation on bi- and multilateral basis.

  7. Combating terrorism and asymmetric threats requires advanced technological assets. Since technological superiority is a major strength of NATO, technology transfer restrictions among Allies hamper the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Alliance as a whole.



Alan Williams
National Armaments Director,
Canada
Strength of Canada:

Private partnership as NATO Flying Training (NFTC)

  • airborne ground surveillance
  • joint strike fighter
  • global project authorization of US help

GDP 2003 / $: 875 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 7 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 60,000




  1. Prague established a sense of urgency and an inventory of specific capability improvements. Capabilities such as sealift, airlift, air-to-air refueling, and airborne ground surveillance now have to be implemented quickly. In the current fiscal environment this will be a challenge.

  2. Anti-terrorism is difficult for a defence deparpent. Many of the issues are within the jurisdiction of civilian authorities supported by the military. We are currently paying close attention to first responders.

  3. We are increasing efforts in Info Warfare, UAV’s, simulation and modeling, sealift, net centric warfare and NBC detection and countermeasures.

  4. Whenever possible we seek interoperability with our allies. For example, our Navy is fully interoperable with the USN, the US Army has adopted a version of the Canadian LAVIII, and we are upgrading our CF-18s and Aurora (P-35).

  5. I advocate competitive procurement; keeping companies competitive domestically ensures competitiveness when exporting. We promote participation in international programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter Program. We have had success with many private partnerships such as NATO Flying Training in Canada.

  6. Our cooperation is good but narrow in focus. Our ability to work with others, in the absence of an over-riding threat such as the Cold War has been reduced. The willingness is there but the means to do so have not kept up. In addition, national needs have taken a certain level of priority over international opportunities.

  7. Concerns about the proliferation of technology and the resultant restrictions are understandable and have made cooperation more difficult but not impossible; the US has recognized this and is introducing measures such as the Global Project Authorization to help.



Jindirch Ploch
National Armaments Director
Czech Republic
Strength of Czech Rep.:

NBC and passive surveillance technology

  • field medicine
  • intelligence warfare
  • US-restrictions sensible

GDP 2003 / $: 147,9 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 2,2 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 52,290




  1. After Prague Summit, improvements in NBC defence, field medicine and passive surveillance systems became the highest priorities for Czech Armed Forces. Strong financial commitments were devoted to these means, aimed to be put at NRF disposal if necessary.

  2. To deal with this new context, our efforts were re-oriented especially on NRBC threats and improving intelligence warfare whereas some projects for “conventional” weapons (supersonics or armoured vehicles) were delayed.

  3. Our efforts will be especially increased in NBC protection, AEW, C4 systems, Mobility keeping for each field in mind of course the need for interoperability.

  4. After seeing our specialized NBC unit in Kuwait, lots of international observers (even US Gen. Franks) praised the top technological level reached by CZ forces in NBC protection. Our experience and knowledge in passive surveillance technology make also Czech Republic one of the leader in this sector.

  5. First of all, most of our defence industry is privatised now. Nevertheless, this sector is not particularly flourishing (like in other Eastern European countries), therefore, whenever it is possible, CZ MoD tries to favour our domestic industry drawing technological transfer and international cooperation and helping also for export.
    For financial resources (in R&D for example), we try to concentrate on fields that are declared of national interests (NRBC protection, passive technology).

  6. Since our entrance to NATO 3 years ago, we had to overcome lots of problems (mostly linked to standardization and interoperability). Our participation to CNAD working groups provided us with the invaluable help not only for technical support but also for industrial questions.
    We are also looking forward to NATO expansion to new countries (Slovakia especially).

  7. As far as US restrictions on technology transfer are concerned, it is a question of balance between potential threats against US national interests and trustfully and balanced relations and consideration between allied nations and partners. These restrictions are more sensible on some fields (radar, GPS, IFF, encrypted communications, satellite for which I don’t see how they can favour transatlantic cooperation.



Jørgen Hansen-Nord
Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence
National Armaments Director
Strength of Denmark:

Electronic warfare and software technology

  • strategic air- and sealift
  • air to air refuelling
  • special Forces

GDP 2003 / $: 149,8 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 2,46 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 29,116




  1. The upcoming political negotiations on the next Danish Defence Agreement will clearly be affected by requirements outlined at the Prague Summit. The NATO Response Force as well as the PCC initiatives are important drivers for the transformation process. Danish commitments to PCC comprise strategic lift capabilities and air-to-air refuelling.

  2. Obviously we need to increase our capabilities to counter terrorism and asymmetric threats. In this respect Denmark is engaged in relevant PCC working groups, primarily those dealing with Combat Effectiveness. Precision guided weapons are presently being procured for both the Navy and the Air Force. Denmark will also strengthen our special forces.

  3. Denmark is primarily increasing its efforts within the mentioned fields of: Precision Guided Munitions, Search and Rescue, UAV and Air Transport. Within the field of Sealift special emphasis is put on the ARK project related to PCC.

  4. Within a multiplicity of areas U.S. and Europe operate different generations of technology; however there are efforts within nations and NATO to close this gap such as PCC. Danish industry is technologically competitive within several areas such as electronic warfare and software technology.

  5. All industrial suppliers recognising the Danish procurement objective – “best value for money” – are welcome. International armaments cooperation as the CNAD is beneficial for the industry too.

  6. Denmark has excellent cooperation with several PfP-countries within operational matters as well as procurement. Among the most important are Sweden and Finland and the three Baltic states (soon to be NATO members). Denmark appreciates the possibility of multinational approaches for procurement and development of equipment, concepts etc. supported by the CNAD structure of NATO. Being a minor investor in defence procurement, there are obvious benefits from co-operation with other users.

  7. The United States is a major locomotive for transformation and new capabilities in NATO. It is also obvious that the exact types of equipment requested in many cases are only produced in the USA. This raises some problems as for instance about security. Such problems are of ten constructively negotiated on a bilateral basis.



Eero Lavonen
Finnish Armaments Director
Strength of Finland:

Meteorological stations and chemical detectors

  • domestic integration
  • EW, C41
  • Net Centric Warfare

GDP 2003 / $: 133,5 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 2 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 32,500




  1. As a militarily non-allied partner country, Finland does not take part in the PCC. However, we are facing similar challenges within the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). We would warmly welcome enhanced co-ordination between the PCC and the ECAP, as both programmes share similar aims with overlapping participants and budgets. Within the ECAP, our focus is on developing special skills, such as NBC protection and deployable CIS, as well as taking advantage of the multilateral co-operation especially with our Nordic neighbours. We follow the development of the NRF and consider it as a positive element which will also complement the EU’s capabilities. It remains to be seen whether NATO Partner countries will be able to participate in the NRF.

  2. In Finland the Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic security, including counter-terrorism. The role of the Defence Forces is to provide support in those situations, where the resources of civil authorities are insufficient. Our aim is to find the best possible combination of tools between the different authorities which entails new challenges also for the Defence Forces. We are currently identifying those military resources which could be made available for protecting the civil society from terrorism and asymmetric threats.

  3. In the ongoing materiel programs Finland is investing in EW, C4I and in the mobility of the readiness brigades. In the future programs the focus will mainly be on the Air Defence, Net Centric Warfare and Inter-Operability.

  4. It is a well-known fact that technology gaps exist at least in the areas of Reconnaissance, UAV’s and Precision Guided Munitions. The Finnish companies have been successful in the US in the fields of meteorological stations and chemical agency detectors. Patria’s Advanced Mortar Systems (AMOS) has also aroused increasing interest in the US markets.

  5. Finland’s defence industry is fairly small in size and focused on limited technology areas. Traditionally the Finnish Defence Forces have invested in R & D through materiel programs carried out in cooperation with the domestic industry. The Finnish Parliament has included general procurement principles in the 2003 Budget, including the aim that 50% of the acquisitions (inclusive of IP and LCC), should be made from domestic sources. Since a substantial part of the Defence Forces’ materiel is procured from abroad, we are aiming at securing the domestic integration and maintenance capabilities in Finland by including a requirement for Industrial Participation in agreements concluded with foreign companies.

  6. We have very positive experiences of cooperation with NATO and the PfP countries. However, after the current NATO enlargement round the remaining PfP countries will have rather different needs and capabilities. Our priority is to maintain the partnership as a relevant and interesting tool for both NATO and PfP countries also in the future.
    In our view the CNAD provides a useful forum for exchanging information between the NATO countries and the PfP countries.

  7. In some cases the US-restrictions have delayed the procurement programs, because it has in some cases taken quite a long time to get approvals for release of materiel and documents.



Laurent Giovachini,
French National Armaments Director
Strength of France:

New technologies against terrorism and asymmetric threat

  • deterrence, C31
  • deep strike, air-land warfare
  • airspace warfare

GDP 2003 / $: 1,51 tril
Def Bud / $ 2003: 41 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 437,069




  1. France has strongly committed itself in the four domains of the PCC in accordance with the objectives of its new Military Programme Planning Law. This has been done in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way with the ECAP in which France is also involved.

  2. We have to fight against terrorism and asymmetric threats. These are complex issues where new technologies and new systems, such as C3I, can improve significantly the efficiency of forces. Within the CNAD subordinate structure, France pays particular attention to the identification of equipment and technology that can assist in the defence against terrorism.

  3. France has identified eight defence capabilities (deterrence, C3I, strategic and tactical mobility, deep strike, air-land warfare, air-space warfare, air-sea warfare, and readiness) and accordingly forty key defence technological capabilities. France will increase its efforts very significantly in these technologies according to the new military programme planning law.

  4. The goal for France and Europe is at first to satisfy the needs of its forces. It’s also a contribution in kind to support the burden that our common defence represents. This objective has to be reached in priority by a qualified European industry of armament.

  5. The European industry of armament suffers from a dissemination of theEuropean efforts. We must seek a greater convergence of our military needs in order to find co-operative opportunities that allows us a better use of our expenditure. It’s particularly the case for R&D.

  6. The CNAD and its subordinate committees are important forums for discussion on interoperability and armament co-operation. Many co-operative programmes in which my country is involved have been initiated in the CNAD.

  7. A true partnership can only be achieved through a balanced transatlantic co-operation. France is pushing its efforts in this way.



Dr. Jörg Kaempf
National Armaments Director,
Germany

Strength of Germany:

Competitive with US within Foreign Competitive Testing (FTC)

  • strategic transport and reconnaissance
  • precision guided munition
  • NBC defence and protection

GDP 2003 / $: 2,174 tril
Def Bud / $ 2003: 25 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 290,600




  1. The PCC constitute on important guideline for the ongoing adjustment of the German armament planning. Our contribution is focussed especially on the areas “Strategic Transport”, “Strategic Reconnaissance”, “Precision Guided Munitions” and “NBC Defence”.

  2. The Bundeswehr has taken relevant measures to deal with the new threats and is participating in the international operation Enduring Freedom with substantial forces. Its NBC reconnaissance capabilities constitute an important asset in this context.

  3. The request for a core capability of airborne surveillance is met by enhancing our technological activities in the field of C4ISR. Our current R&T planning is focussed with continuously increasing emphasis on technologies for reconnaissance, effectiveness, mobility and protection.

  4. Germany is currently concentrating its efforts on all areas of technology related to increased capabilities for the participation of the Bundeswehr in international operations. Technologically, Germany considers itself basically competitive with the US, which themselves have identified a number of European products within its Foreign Competitive Testing Programme (FTC) as outstanding. However, Germany has comparatively limited resources to field modern equipment in short time.

  5. Germany together with its European Partners is striving for a competitive European industrial base. The allocation of contracts is ruled by the principle of choosing the most qualified contractor. The measure for benefits of PPP is their competitive value. International cooperation is encouraged on the basis of mutually benefiting regulations for technology transfer.

  6. Germany has started cooperation with PfP countries very early in many cases based on bilateral co-operation agreements. Activities of NATO, especially those of the CNAD, are fully supported.

  7. The necessary restrictions aiming at preventing proliferation often result in delays or even break-up of co-operative projects. Improvement is neces-
    sary.



Spiros Travlos,
Secretary General and National Armaments Director,
Greece

Strength of Greece:

Increase participation of domestic industry

  • UAV and air defence
  • air transport
  • air defence

GDP 2003 / $: 189,7 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 6,6 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 181,571




  1. The process of military capabilities transformation in Greece, which entails and transformation of national armed forces, is in progress. All relevant NATO developments, like NRF, will be taken into account. Greece in order to meet, as far as possible, the new requirements of Alliance adapts accordingly the National mid-term equipment plans.

  2. Hellenic armed forces trying to contribute, as much as possible, in fighting international terrorism, are currently making changes to their armaments planning and reviewing the rules of engagement. We are expecting the developments on NATO competent bodies in the defence against terrorism, in order to explore the possibility and the way for further national contribution in the armaments sector.

  3. Technology fields where our country is going to increase its efforts, according to priority, are as follows: Information warfare, Air defence, Inter-operability, UAV, Air transport, C4.

  4. We see technology gaps to the US in many sectors of armaments. Our defence industries work as sub-contractors to prime US contractors on programmes of National interest in various sectors of technology according to our priorities.

  5. It is our strategic option to increase the participation of the domestic defence industry in the total military procurement budget. We promote the participation of domestic companies in major armament programs at an increasing rate. In parallel, we favour international co-operations for the achievement of three main objectives: Opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition, strengthening the defence technological and industrial base, intensifying cooperation in research and development.

  6. There is a positive experience regarding the cooperation between NATO and partner for peace (PfP) countries, especially in the area of production and acquisition of “NATO standard” equipments.

  7. Technology restrictions due to US-administration practices, especially with certain End Use Certificate restrictions (US proposal: “blanket assurances”) such as technology transfers, training, etc, create problems on transatlantic cooperation.



Admiral Giampaolo di Paola,
National Armaments Director

Strength of Italy:

Lead in 25 multinational activities of PCC

  • new doctrines, concepts, technologies and platforms
  • UAVs
  • space technologies

GDP 2003 / $: 1,402 tril
Def Bud / $ 2003: 20,5 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 211,926




  1. Even before the Prague summit Italy was significantly involved in the development of most important capabilities later identified in four macro-areas . This means that Italy is one of the countries mostly contributing to the Prague Commitment.
    At the moment Italy is also the Lead Nation of two of 25 multinational joint activities decided at the Prague Conference.

  2. To respond to new challenges related to international terrorism and assymetric threats we need new capabilities, we need to be more innovative by developing new doctrines, and by leveraging on technological innovation to retain the operational edge.
    To this end we are pursuing a capabilities-based approach to defence planning and we are investing more in technology and technology cooperation. Fair technology cooperation, within Europe and across the Atlantic, will also result in a stronger transatlantic bond.

  3. Looking today at 2030 horizon and beyond, we are looking for investing in new concepts, technologies and platforms to conduct future operations. The UAV concept is gaining momentum as one of the main and innovative trend for future air operation.
    Investing in C4 technologies and also in Net-centric warfare – where C4I and space technologies are the indispensable glue - rather than platform centric warfare is, in my opinion, the key to the future. Satellite programmes both for communication, navigation and remote sensing are also essential to improved C4I capabilities and Net-centric warfare. In this area Skymed Cosmos and Sicral Satellites are very important examples of innovative projects we are investing in.

  4. It is unrealistic to think possible to fill the gap “across the spectum” with the USA because the levels of our resources are too different. We have to identify those sectors and technologies where, by joining current and perspective European resources, it could be reasonable to think of standing up the comparison to the US.
    I am referring, for example, to key-technologies (communications, information technologies, UAV, radar technologies or nanotechnologies or other sectors) where I believe keeping pace with the USA is not out of our reach.
    In some sectors we are already investing with the US: for example, we are already joining efforts to develop programmes such as MEADS, AGS (Air Ground Surveillance).

  5. The Italian policy is to support the reorganisation and the consolidation of the choices made the Italian and European industrial base.
    Within this framework we favour the industrial efficiency and competitiveness also through privatisation and support those areas where we believe we have towers of excellence.
    Government’s support to industrial activities is an element and a multiplying factor for our security policy, and contributes to develop a Defence and Security European Identity of which a competitive industrial base is an essential component.

  6. Over the last few years the NATO countries have been trying to integrate the PfP Countries in the CNAD activities as far as possible. This co-operation is very significant in particular in the areas of interoperability (E.g. the soldier system interoperability or the standardisation of precision landing systems).
    To me, the interoperability of the existing systems and those that NATO and PfP Countries are developing is to be strongly pursued to improve the operational capability of the multinational Units where NATO and PfP forces work side by sides.

  7. Restrictions on technology implies a problem. If the US really wants its leading European allies to be interoperable with them, they should understand that technological restrictions could cause a separation, since European nations are unlikely to invest in cooperation programmes with the US without the benefit of transparency. Technology sharing should be a must. I believe in transatlantic cooperation, we should be able to take advantage of a fair technological transfer. The recent President Bush’s directive to encourage Missile Defence cooperation with the Allies is an important step on the path to the strengthening of our current cooperation.



Anrijs Brencans
Deputy State Secretary for Acquisition,
Latvia

Strength of Latvia:

Sea surveillance systems

  • C2 and CIS superiority
  • combat effectiveness
  • deployment and sustainment

GDP 2003 / $: 18,6 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 165,4 mil
Number of soldiers 2003: 19,655




  1. Latvia is reviewing National Defence Concept and Armed Force Structure, which will take into account forthcoming NATO requirements and will aim to enhance NAF deployable and sustainable force capabilities.
    PCC requirements are already being taken into account: to ensure C2 and CIS superiority, Latvia is improving its sea and air surveillance capabilities, and developing Baltic CIS System. To ensure defence against NBC attacks, Latvia has set a priority to provide NBC defence capabilities for deployable forces. Likewise, Latvia is approaching other PCC areas – those addressing combat effectiveness, deployment and sustainment of the forces.

  2. Government has approved the Action plan to prevent terrorist’s access to Latvian territory or the use of Latvia’s assets. Latvia’s chemical, biological and radiological protection capabilities are being increased by acquiring the equipment and rehearsing response arrangements. Latvia’s priority – development of specialized units ready to participate in the international operations.

  3. Development of Air Surveilance System within the BALTNET, Air Force – Search and Rescue, transport capability development, Navy – development of Sea Surveilance system. Build-up of EOD and NBC defence abilities.

  4. Although Latvia has not the resourcese to develop advanced technologies, we are looking for development of specialized capabilities. The Baltic military cooperation in this area is of high importance.

  5. Due to yet undeveloped Latvia’s industrial base, we are increasing efforts on Latvian scientists’ involvement in different NATO projects.

  6. Being a partner country, Latvia has gained good experience in CNAD. We are looking forward to increase our involvement in CNAD after joining the Alliance.

  7. In certain areas, these technology restrictions are slowing down Latvia on reaching highly developed military technology, as well as full interoperability with NATO.




Linas Antantes Linkevicius

The Lithuanian Minister of Defence answered our questions to the National Armaments Director

Strength of Lithuania:

Laser trainers for riflemen, mortars simulator

  • anti-terrorism programme
  • biotechnology
  • NBC protective clothes

GDP 2003 / $: 27,4 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 305 mil
Number of soldiers 2003: 15,200




  1. Lithuania understands the importance of the Prague Summit decisions on capability building and establishment of NATO Response Force. As a future ally, Lithuania is already concentrating on modernisation of its armed forces and capabilities building, that is related to the implementation of Prague Capabilities Commitments and is considering the possible contribution to the NRF.

  2. Every effort to fight terrorism is reflected in Lithuania’s National Security Strategy bakked up by the Antiterrorism Programme adopted by the Parliament. Our political determination is corroborated by the participation in Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan as well as by our readiness to assist international attempts to solve Iraq crisis. At the same time Lithuania is aware that anti-terrorism policy must address a wide spectrum of non-military measures in regard to social, financial causes of terrorism.

  3. Four scientific areas – Biotechnology, Mechatronics, Laser Technology and Information Technology – where Lithuania boasts significant achievements and a sufficiently strong industrial base were chosen as priority research areas in Lithuania. Lithuanian scientific potential is being successfully used in such technology fields as Simulation and Training (Laser trainers for riflemen, Mortars’ simulators, and Tactics battlefield simulators), Reconnaissance (Sensors, Detectors), and Logistics (Combat Casualty Care equipment, Crisis Medicine Management etc.).

  4. Several Lithuanian research institutions and companies dealing with laser technologies have been recognized as world leaders of R&D in the field of generation of widely tuneable femtosecond and picosecond laser pulses. A number of laser products constructed by Lithuanian companies are used by US research institutions. Innovative non-invasive technologies for Traumatic brain injury, technologies in front door protection against short electromagnetic pulses could also be used to the benefit of our future partners.

  5. The Lithuanian industry is able to provide the Lithuanian Armed Forces with ammunition, handheld radio stations, personal uniforms and equipment, special protective clothes, vests and helmets, NBC protective clothes, food rations and other. Thus Lithuania supports and stimulates its national industry.

  6. Lithuania gained a great deal from the mechanisms of the PfP as an aspirant country. We were given practical means to prepare for NATO membership and developing capable Armed Forces. Lithuania welcomes a more regional approach of PfP and is ready to share its experience of participation in PfP with other interested countries.
    CNAD activities allow us to familiarize with the necessary procedures, information on various projects, NATO standards. Lithuania expects to increase its participation in activities in the foreseeable future.

  7. In 1997, the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania has signed an Agreement with the Department of Defence of the US concerning exchange of Research and Development Information. In some instances electronic components developed by US companies are not available for Lithuanian customers due to existing export restrictions, however, it is not the case when concrete projects are agreed and implemented.



Rear Admiral ir. D. (Dirk) van Dord,
Netherlands Armaments Director
Strength of Netherlands:

Extra budgets for ESDP

  • secure communication
  • information superiority
  • sealift and PGMs

GDP 2003 / $: 413 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 8,6 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 48,580




  1. The Dutch armament programs have been scanned regarding compliance with PCC. Some programs were already in line with PCC. Other projects have been prioritised. The Netherlands has made available extra budgets for programs regarding ESDP that also contribute to PCC.

  2. Requirements of the Dutch Armed Forces are geared to fulfilling all tasks and missions and therefore against terrorism.

  3. Technology fields where the Netherlands is increasing its efforts are among others:NBC-defence, Air Defence, secure communications, information superiority, Sealift and PGMs.

  4. Technology gaps with the US are mainly related to C4ISR. The NLcontribution to USequipment is limited.

  5. R&T funding is primarily reserved for the Netherlands Defence Research Laboratory (TNO). International co-operation is a high priority in Netherlands armament programs. All aspects of technology transfer are followed closely and anticipated where possible. Export assistance is not the primary responsibility of the NLMinisty of Defence but of the NLMinistry of Economic Affairs. Defence involvement and support in this area is therefore modest.

  6. The Dutch cooperation with PfP countries concentrates on the fields of R&T and armament policy.

  7. The Netherlands cooperates closely with the US to further the unhindered transfer of technology. To this end the Netherlands signed a Declaration of Principles with the US.



Leif Lindbäck
National Armaments Director,
Norway

Strength of Norway:

Penguin missile and remote weapon systems for US

  • fully interoperable Forces
  • CBRN-defence
  • strong simulator and maritime industry

GDP 2003 / $: 137,8 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 4 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 31,600




  1. Substantial funds have been re-prioritised within national plans. Norwegian commitments put great emphasis on contributing to multinational initiatives like airlift, sealift, air-to-air refuelling etc. We are convinced that future allied defence structures will have to be more closely integrated with fully interoperable forces.

  2. Measures to enhance the level of anti-terrorism is reflected in the current defence planning. Additionally Norway will accept all NATO Force Goals covering CBRN-defence.

  3. According to PCC, Norway will pay increased attention to: PGMs, surveillance and reconnaissance, sealift and airlift. A central goal of next long-term plan is to take the step into a network centric defence concept.

  4. US Navy has procured Penguin Anti-Ship Missiles from Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace for use on Naval helicopters. Further, the US Army has procured the Remote Weapon System from Kongsberg Protech. A bilateral program worth mentioning would be the cooperation between Kongsberg and Raytheon on Air Defence. I believe Norway has world class technology within the areas of command and control, anti-ship missiles, communications, simulations as well as munitions. Also, historically our maritime industry has been very successful on foreign markets.

  5. We have established our national defence industrial strategy in which we try to maintain capability within certain strategically important areas. We have identified 9 such areas, and we encourage our foreign partners to initiate cooperative programs within these areas. A healthy defence industry is vital for our defence forces, with regards to maintenance but may be even more important to maintain a knowledge base in Norway so that the Armed Forces can continue to be an informed customer. Also, we can not deny that hi-tech defence industry has a spin off effect on dual use commercial industry.

  6. Norway favours joint owned and operated NATO programs. As a small nation, we can not afford to acquire all equipment necessary to run our Armed Forces on our own. C4I and surveillance are areas where NATO should play a role, and it is my hope that we in the near future will find a solution to the Air to Ground Surveillance question in NATO. CNAD is the vital forum for these discussions. Furthermore, CNAD is a useful place to discuss bilateral matters with my fellow armaments directors.

  7. Standardisation is no longer a viable option for our Forces. We must therefore aim for interoperability. US restrictions and slow bureaucratic processes are sometimes a hinderance to useful and profitable cooperation across the Atlantic. Timely information is very often the most important criteria in order for defence companies to compete on the same level as US suppliers.



Dr. Janusz Zemke
Secretary of State, First Dep Min of Nat. Defence

Strength of Poland:

3-D radars surpass those originated in US

  • detection of contamination
  • optronics and C3 systems
  • precision-guided munition

GDP 2003 / $: 339,6 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 3,5 bil
Number of soldiers 2003:160,000




  1. The main effort will be directed towards activities supporting the integration of national armed forces with armies of other member states through the adaptation of structures, refinement of decision-making procedures and equipping of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) in materiel congruent with NATO standards (e.g. communications). Poland has declared co-operation in many PCC areas with particular focus on NBC military units.

  2. Anti-terrorist activities and asymmetric threats, due to their nature, require broad international co-operation. We have started to accelerate the information flow between responsible services and have intensified the exchange of experience in this area.

  3. The main focus within the PAF has been directed to such fields as NBC protection and detection of contamination, optronics, precision-guided munitions, as well as C3 systems. As we can observe worldwide, these fields are rapidly developing. Thus, the extension of defence sector co-operation in the fields should enable us to maintain strong ties with our foreign partners.

  4. The US technological superiority is obvious. It mainly results from a broad scientific and techological base as well as economical capabilities of this country. Through effectively conducted co-operation with our partners we can locate technological niches, in which particular products match or even surpass those originated in the US (e.g. 3-D radars).

  5. We are continuously increasing the effertiveness of our R&D effort as well as implemertation of particular products destined for the defence sector. Emphasis is also being put on the channelling of financial resources towards technological areas significant to the national defence. Furthermore, we are restructuring and diversifying our defence sector to produce equipment that increasingly meets NATO standards. Finally, more effort is being devoted to the creation of a functional legal and financial base conducive to an intensification of internationa1 co-operation within the defence sector.

  6. The co-operation renders both direct and indirect benefits. The exhcangeof experiences, as well as the initiation of contacts at lower levels is a significant building block for the creation of a synergy within the international co-operative framework.

  7. As a country with limited economical resources we try to learn from our partners as much as we can. Due to the defence needs, oftentimes it is required to receive a technologically advanced final product as opposed to spend much effort on R&D or impelementing technologies, whose costs exceed the financial capabilities of the domestic defence budget. However, full access to technologies – while taking into consideration their rapid advancement – is necessary. The building of mutual trust should foster a deepening exchange of technological know-how.



 

General Carlos Villar Turrau
National Armaments Director,
Spain

Strength of Spain:

Micro-satellites, micro-electronics, shipbuilding and air refuelling technology

  • information security
  • transport helicopters and landing platform
  • air-to air refuelling

GDP 2003 / $: 757 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 7 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 149,171




  1. Spain has assumed 35 national specific commitments in PCC. Among them Spain leads 2 multinational groups for development and/or provision of transport helicopters and landing platform dock. Moreover, the most outstanding thing is the Spanish leadership of the multinational initiative to increase NATO air-to-air refuelling capability.

  2. The majority of the capabilities needed against terrorism are not unique and have also a “conventional” use. Our efforts are mainly focused on the PCC and the NRF.

  3. Our planning considers priorities in information technologies, platform and weapon design as well as soldier technology. On the other hand, some specific examples of technologies of increasing interest are those related to interoperability, information security, UAVs, EW, etc.

  4. In general, all areas of technology are below the US level, but for example, microsatellites and microelectronics are at an acceptable level, as well as naval shipbuilding and air industry lines of production.
    The US DoD has bought formerly auxiliary equipment tank parts and some C-212 and CN-235 aeroplanes.
    The simulators, trainers and automatic test equipment have some tradition as supplied equipment to the US Forces (Tomcat F-14, Cass ATEs, etc.).

  5. The MoD supports the Spanish industry with R+D funding, entirely in national programs or the Sp part in international co-operative programs.
    Our policy is to support the national defence industry through bilateral and multilateral international relations, fostering the industrial co-operation and export efforts.

  6. I see an increasing participation of PfP countries in the CNAD and NATO activities and significant interest in armaments – related co-operative efforts.
    As to our involvement in CNAD, this represents for us a unique forum to share ideas and projects with our Allies.

  7. Any of the US technology restrictions would have a negative impact in the transatlantic co-operation spirit. But we are confident the American administration considers a more flexible policy in the future.



 

Birgitta Böhlin
National Armaments Director,
Sweden

Strength of Sweden:

Ongoing cooperation with US regarding Net Centric Warfare

  • Net Centric Warfare
  • simulation and training
  • transfer civilian technology to defence

GDP 2003 / $: 219 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 5 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 40,770




  1. As Sweden is a PfP country, we don’t contribute to either PCC or NRF. Having said this, international cooperation in order to secure the supply of highly advanced defence systems at affordable costs to the Swedish Armed Forces, is of course essential from a Swedish perspective.

  2. Sweden is developing a new defence, which will be able to operate in a network-based environment. The threats you mention in your question are part of the threats we are looking at.

  3. In Sweden we will increase our efforts regarding Information Warfare, Precision Guided Munitions, Reconnaissance, Inter-Operability, UAV, Net Centric Warfare, Simulation and Training, C4, EW.

  4. Sweden has an ongoing cooperation with US regarding Net Centric Warfare.

  5. In R+D funding we will probably focus on a few technology areas where we believe industry and authorities can be successful. International cooperation, I think, will be the way for future supply. The new net centric defence that Sweden builds demands transferring of civilian technology. I also believe that the Swedish defence will support its activity from an increasing part of suppliers. We will see export support to Swedish companies in certain niches.

  6. Our involvement has increased since 1994 when Sweden became a PfP member, linked to our interest in interoperability issues. Last but not least, CNAD is an important occasion where I have the opportunity to meet with my NATO and PfP colleagues and discuss matters of mutual interest as well as exchange information.

  7. Sweden has since the end of World War 2 had a close cooperation with US in several technology fields. A cooperation that has helped Sweden developing an advanced defence industry. Although technology restrictions will have an impact, I don’t expect them to be more restrictive to Sweden than to any other country.



 

Dr. Alfred Markwalder
National Armaments Director,
Switzerland

Strength of Switzerland:

Air defence well equipped

  • smaller more mobile and versatile
  • cooperation with domestic partners (police, civil protection)
  • communication and information systems

GDP 2003 / $: 226 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 4,3 bil SF
Number of soldiers 2003: 3,484




  1. As Non-Nato-Member Switzerland is not directly affected by the decisions.

  2. The Swiss Armed Forces will be smaller, more mobile and versatile, and equipped with modern systems in key areas. The armed forces closely cooperate with domestic partners (police, civil protection) and maintain an intensive exchange of information with foreign countries.

  3. Air Defence, Communication and Information Systems, Reconnaissance, Search and Rescue, Inter-Operability, Mobility, Simulation and Training, Information Warfare, Precision Guided Munitions.

  4. The Swiss Armed Forces operate command-, control- and weapon systems at a high technical level. Especially the air defence is well-equipped and will be continuously modernized. Also in the future we want to maintain a technological level corresponding to a good European average.

  5. Switzerland has its own competitive armament industry whose organization is laid down in the “Principles” adopted by the federal council. It is supported by direct orders, particularly in the field of industrial maintenance. The export and the participation in international armament projects are also promoted.

  6. NATO has considerably opened toward PfP-countries. Today these countries are increasingly active in NATO Working Groups and more involved than in the past. The meetings of National Armement Directors Representatives are an ideal basis for an active bi- and mulilateral exchange of information, which is indispensable for countries like Switzerland. In addition the CNAD Working Groups are important sources of information for Switzerland, which very much help to achieve interoperability with foreign countries.

  7. The Swiss Armed Forces successfully operate various weapon systems of US origin (e.g. F/A-18 fighter aircraft). Cooperation and exchange of information can be described as good.



 

Major General Suleyman Arikan
National Armaments Director,
Turkey

Strength of Turkey:

Software, defence electronics, armoured tracked vehicles, aerospace

  • international Police Force (PCC:lead Poland)
  • target acquisition
  • stealth capability

GDP 2003 / $: 443 bil
Def Bud / $ 2003: 4,6 bil
Number of soldiers 2003: 511,000




  1. In context of PCC, Turkey had proven her willingness by sending 25 commitment forms to the four capability areas. Turkey agreed to contribute to the multinational arrangements of Strategic Airlift Capability and Sealift Capability by signing statement of intent for each at Prague Summit. We also decided to participate in Air-to-Air Refuelling Working Group leaded by Spain, Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear Working Group leaded by UK and International Military Police Force leaded by Poland. Furthermore, we are ready to contribute to any other multinational initiatives, in case the conditions permit.
    Turkey has been supporting NRF idea since it was introduced. After the approval of NRF Concept, Turkey will determine the size and the type of her contribution to this force. Turkey is willing to participate in all initiatives for regional and global peace and security within her means and capabilities.

  2. It is obvious that terrorism has become a global threat. Any kind of terrorism, no matter who the originator is or which motive it has, not only aims the destruction of human rights, but also exploits the same values to deceive the world’s public opinion. Therefore, we condemn terrorism and attribute the first priority to terrorism on the list of the contemporary threats to the peace and stability in the world. Due to the experiences gained by Turkey, in order to struggle effectively against terrorism an international effort is required.

  3. Turkish defence industry came already to display a strong presence in the software, defence electronics, naval shipbuilding, aerospace, armoured and tracked vehicles, general armament and ammunition, and C4 systems.
    Turkey is being planned to improve its technological capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air to ground surveillance; command and control and communications; combat effectiveness including long range precision guided munitions, and their launch platforms with special regard to stealth capability, and suppression of enemy air defence.

  4. The US currently has the edge in some military technologies such as: command and control systems (specifically, secure communications) high accurate “smart weapons”, reconnaissance and intelligence systems and stealth technologies. Like stealth aircraft, there are a few areas in which the United States uses technology that other allies have not yet mastered. Furthermore, the US is alone responsible for the satellite precision navigational system (GPS).
    New technologies today are increasingly “the combination of several technologies”. It is driven by the fact that market conditions are highly receptive to new technologies. In addition, as the balance of demand for advanced technologies has shifted over the years more and more towards the civil sector, so leadership in technical changes has also shifted increasingly to the civil sector. Globalization is in part the product of the information technology revolution which has put technical know=how into the public domain where it is easily accessible. Despite all these factors, the main concern of Turkey is not only the technology gap with the US, but the limitations stemmed from “American Export Control Regime” also. Turkey faces some difficulties and unpredicted delays in some important projects due to that regime.

  5. Turkey’s main principle is “to supply all kinds of weapons, ammunition, equipment, material and platform requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces from local sources to the extend possible. On the other hand, our defence industrial policy covers; to make maximum use of Turkey’s existing industrial capabilities and potential, to encourage and support research and development activities, to incorporate foreign technologies and to render possible contributions by foreign capital, and to give emphasis on export and offset trade issues relating to defence industry products.
    The Turkish Defence Industry, in order be able to reach the advanced level necessary in the production of the modern defence equipment of today, is trying to develop its production resources or by participating in joint production projects with the Allied Countries by means of technology gain and work share. In this framework, the cooperation programs carried out with Allied Countries in the structure of NATO or WEAG/WEAO, occupy a significant place in Turkey’s defence industry activities.

  6. We have actively contributed to all cooperation activities between NATO and Partner countries, from peacekeeping operations to training activities in a multitude of areas. We possess a PfP Training Center in Ankara that has organized and conducted many courses, seminars and exercises for Partners. We are determined to continue our support for further expanding and deepening of PfP cooperation, especially in the light of the new mechanisms such as IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) and PAP=T (Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism).
    In that regard, CNAD is a very useful platform to exchange of views among the allied nations in the field of armaments cooperation. We all aware CNAD is the cradle of the most important collaborative NATO armaments programs and projects.

  7. As is known, US administration practices certain technology restrictions, arguing that she has to assure her own security by not transferring some critical and strategic technologies. However, those restrictions have certain impacts on transatlantic cooperation as well as standardization and flow of information. Because of those restrictions, efforts to narrow the capability gap among mainly western allies in transatlantic security market had limited practical effects. On the other hand, the notion of interoperability needs to be realized in a manner of free flow of information. Despite recent initiatives particularly Defense Trade Security Initiatives and ITAR exemptions to ease those restrictions, more efforts may be exerted in order to accelerate transatlantic cooperation and flow of information.

Share

Comments